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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
 
There is an emerging consensus that trade, if well managed, can play an important role of 
promoting sustained economic growth and development and it is this that has provided an 
impetus to development oriented international trade and economic integration.1  It is in this 
context that the role of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has been deemed crucial in 
helping countries integrate beneficially into the international trading system.2 
The WTO is the leading global international organisation that seeks to unify the world’s vast and 
divergent economies, political and legal systems through trade.3 It creates a level field through 
which all its members can benefit from international trade and it provides for transparency, 
predictability and stability in terms of market access and other international trade issues.4 The 
Organisation relies on negotiations and trade agreements to liberate multilateral trade and to 
eliminate trade imbalances, such as, discrimination and favouritism.5 It has a system of rules 
and regulations which set out a predictable legal regime for the regulation of trade agreements 
and the resolution of disputes among its members.6 
The WTO’s goal of liberating multilateral trade is not an end in itself and neither does it exist in a 
vacuum devoid of other requirements set out in the Marrakesh Agreement.7 In the preamble of 
                                                          
1
 Spanu V ‘Liberalisation of the International Trade and Economic Growth: Implications for both Developed and 
Developing countries’ (published final paper, Harvard Kennedy School of Government 2003) 1. (Hereafter Spanu V 
‘Liberalisation of the International Trade and Economic growth’, 2003). Available at  
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/Papers/Spanu.pdf  (accessed on 22/05/2013). 
2
 Basu R S ‘Does WTO accession affect domestic policy making and institutions?’ (Working paper by the United 
Nations Committee on Trade  and Development (UNCTAD) 2003) 3. 
3
 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation of 1994. (Hereafter The WTO Agreement of 
1994). 
4
 Adhikari R, Dahal N and Pradhanga M ‘Ensuring Development Supportive Accession of Least Developed Countries 
to the World Trade Organisation; Learning from Nepal’ (Published paper by the International Institute for 
Sustainable Development, 2008) 5. (Hereafter Adhikari R, Dahal N & Pradhanga M Learning from Nepal, 2008). 
5
 Adhikari R, Dahal N and Pradhanga M ‘Learning from Nepal’ (2008) 5. 
6
 The WTO Agreement of 1994. 
7
 Nguyen N ‘WTO Accession at Any Cost? Examining the Use of WTO-Plus and WTO-Minus Obligations for Least 
Developed Country Applicants.’(2009) 22 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 243-247, 243. 
(Hereafter Nguyen N 2009). 
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the Agreement establishing the WTO, it is clearly stated that parties to this Agreement while in 
the process of attaining their economic and trade endeavours should do so with a view to 
raising standards of living, to ensuring full development, full employment and a steadily growing 
volume of income and effective demand, to expanding the production of and  trade in goods and 
services and to allow for maximum use of the world’s resources in accordance with the aim of 
sustainable development.8 The belief that these benefits will be bestowed upon those who 
become members has been the propelling force enticing countries to accede to this multilateral 
trading system.9 However, achieving this depends on supportive terms of accession. 
1.2 Problem statement 
 
Countries acceding to the WTO negotiate accession based on the knowledge of what their 
comparative advantages and disadvantages are.10 They pick winners or industries that they 
hope to protect but also try to gain access for their competitive industries. Had countries been 
permitted to only relax import controls and not gain greater market access, few would actively 
pursue membership.11 Market access refers to the openness of a country’s market to foreign 
goods and services,12 and the WTO specifically requires that members reduce import barriers 
as well as any other measures that may act as obstacles to trade.13 In the case of countries 
acceding to the WTO, obtaining specific favourable market access is to all intents and purposes 
the quid pro quo for adopting commitments at their highest levels to introduce reforms in 
domestic policies, including border measures.14 
 
However, in recent years, the WTO accession process for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 
has been fraught with a number of difficulties and delays. This is mainly so because incumbent 
WTO members in a bid to obtain favourable market access terms exert immense pressure on 
                                                          
8
 The WTO Agreement of 1994. 
9
 Jackson J H The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations 2ed (1989) 9. 
10
 Lacey S ‘WTO Accession from the Perspective of WTO members. The View from the Other Side of the Table’ 
(Published paper by Leiden Law School, 2006)3. (Hereafter Lacey S ‘WTO Accession from the Perspective of WTO 
Members’ 2006). 
11
 Lacey S ‘WTO Accession from the Perspective of WTO Members’ (2006) 3. 
12
 Definition of ‘market access’ available at 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/market-access.html  (accessed on 05/06/2013). 
13
 Definition of ‘market access’ available at 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/market-access.htm l  (accessed on 05/06/2013). 
14
 Evenett S J, Gage J & Kennett M ‘WTO membership and market access: Evidence from the accessions of Bulgaria 
and Ecuador’.  Available at  
https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/publications/22175/L-it  (accessed on 30/04/2013). 
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acceding LDCs to undertake commitments that go beyond those stipulated in the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and WTO agreements. They also exert immense 
pressure on LDCs to take up commitments which do not take into account the handicapped 
level of trade and development challenges faced by most LDCs. Hence, in recognition of these 
particular challenges, the WTO membership made accession of LDCs a priority. In the 2001 
Doha Ministerial Declaration, the WTO members agreed that they would facilitate and 
accelerate negotiations with acceding LDCs.15 To put this ambition into practice, members of 
the General Council adopted a series of measures to facilitate and accelerate accession of 
LDCs to the WTO through simplified and streamlined accession procedures, with a view to 
concluding these negotiations as quickly as possible.16 Members were requested to give more 
consideration to the specific needs of acceding countries particularly in the areas of market 
access, the WTO rules process, trade related assistance, and capacity building.17 
 
Unfortunately, the 2002 accession guidelines failed to achieve the objectives for which they had 
been created, viz to help limit to a greater extent the possibility of imposing unfair condition on 
the LDCs. It was in this light therefore that the 2002 accession guidelines for LDCs were 
reaffirmed at the Eighth Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong, in July 2012.18 According to these 
new guidelines, WTO members were yet again called upon to exercise restraint when seeking 
concessions and commitments on trade in goods and services taking into account the same 
levels undertaken by existing WTO LDC members and levels that were commensurate with their 
individual development, financial and trade needs.19 These guidelines, however, face a fair 
share of criticism as being likely to do LDCs more harm than good.20 It is submitted that they do 
not ameliorate the accession conditions of LDCs because they still fail to address the onerous 
obligations placed on the new applicants by incumbent members of the WTO. According to the 
market access benchmark on goods, LDCs are required to bind their tariff rates at levels lower 
                                                          
15
 Paragraph 42 of the WTO, Doha Ministerial Declaration (2001; WT/MIN (01) DEC/1. 
16
 Paragraph 1 of the General Council Decision on LDC accession adopted on 10 December 2002, WT/L/508. 
(Hereafter WTO document WT/L/508). 
17
 WTO document WT/L/508. 
18
 World Trade Organisation, Accession of Least-Developed Countries, decision of 17 December 2012, WT/L/846 
(Dec. 19, 2012), available  at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min11_e/official_doc_e.htm. 
(accessed on 07/02/2013). (Hereafter the WTO Accession of Least Developed Countries WT/L/846). 
19
 The WTO Accession of Least Developed Countries WT/L/846. 
20
 ‘New accession guidelines may harm LDCs’ published in SUNS #7420 dated 27 July 2012.  Available at  
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/wto.info/2012/twninfo120803.htm   (accessed on 13/05/2013). 
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than those of existing LDCs and original members of the WTO.21  At the other end of the 
spectrum, the benchmark on services reiterates the very same principles that were enshrined in 
the 2002 guidelines but which have not applied.22 They fail to provide a distinct level or extent to 
which LDCs may liberalise their services sectors and subsectors and LDCs are therefore still 
being forced to make commitments far more extensive than those of incumbent members. 
 
Consequently, it has been observed that the failure of the multilateral trading system over the 
past decade to adequately deliver concrete positive results as far as market access 
commitments are involved has detrimental implications for most LDCs.23 It obstructs their efforts 
to achieve greater participation in world trade and to boost trade led development, poverty 
reduction and economic diversification.24 This is so because the economic prosperity of these 
countries is structured around, but not limited to, the following main factors: policy space to 
promote infant industries, the ability to restrict an influx of poor and substandard imports into 
their markets, as well as the ability to use the trade revenues derived from their existent tariff 
levels to boost their economies. The curtailment of all these three factors are some of the main 
adverse implications likely to arise as a result of the adoption of the market access benchmarks 
on both goods and services in the accession guidelines for LDCs. 
 
There is therefore a need to scrutinise these resulting implications in greater details from the 
perspective of a new independent African LDC like South Sudan.  
1.3 Significance of the study 
 
South Sudan, the newest country of the world, is also among the poorest with a very fragile and 
underdeveloped economy.25 Its history of conflict and its current challenges make it the most 
vulnerable, country too.26 It has limited market access and a very archaic agricultural sector and 
is greatly dependent on imports from neighbouring countries, including, Sudan, Kenya and 
                                                          
21
 The WTO Accession of Least Developed Countries WT/L/846. 
22
 The WTO Accession of Least Developed Countries WT/L/846. 
23
 Birkbeck D C & Jones E ‘Beyond the Eighth Ministerial Conference of the WTO: A forward looking agenda for 
development’ (Published paper by Oxford University, 2011) 4. (Hereafter Birkbeck D C & Jones E 2011). 
24
 Birkbeck D C & Jones E (2011) 4. 
25
 Tadesse D ‘Post Independence: South Sudan: The challenges ahead.’(ISPI Working Paper, 2012) 3. 
26
 The World Bank country overview, South Sudan available at 
.http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southsudan/overview  (accessed on 15/03/2013). 
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Uganda.27 In order for South Sudan to meet its aim of sustainable economic development, trade 
liberalisation and improvement of the welfare and livelihood of its citizens, membership of 
multilateral, regional and bilateral trade agreements are essential instruments for increased 
trade.28 
South Sudan is a landlocked country bordered by Sudan to the north, Ethiopia to the east, 
Uganda and Kenya to the southeast, Democratic Republic of Congo to the southwest and 
Central African Republic to the west.29 It has an estimated population of 8.2 million.30 Its total 
area of 644329 square kms consists of Savannah and arable woodland in the centre, north and 
south-east.31 
On 9 July 2011 the Republic of South Sudan became an independent state following a peaceful 
referendum in January 2011.32 The referendum was part of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) signed by the central government of Sudan and the then southern based 
rebel group, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), to end the two decades of 
conflict. 33  As a new nation without a history of formal institutions, rules or administration 
accepted as legitimate by its society, independence presented South Sudan with an opportunity 
to embark on development efforts to address these devastating effects of a war-torn past and 
poverty.34 
                                                          
27
 South Sudan economy profile 2012. Available at  
.http://www.indexmundi.com/south_sudan/economy_profile.html   (accessed on 13/03/2013). 
28
 A ‘multilateral trade agreement’ refers to an agreement between two or more countries who wish to regulate 
the trade between them whereas a ‘bilateral trade agreement’ is an economic contract between two countries. A 
‘regional trade agreement’, on the other hand, refers to free trade among a number of nations in a specified area 
or region. Available at  
http://www.ehow.com/about_6516635_definition-bilateral-trade-agreement.html 
 (accessed on 10/10/2012). 
29
  Government of South Sudan official website available at  
http://www.gossonline.org/magnoliaPublic/en/about/history.html  (accessed on 23/05/2013). 
30
 Government of South Sudan official website available at  
http://www.gossonline.org/magnoliaPublic/en/about/history.html   (accessed on 23/05/2013 0. 
31
 Government of South Sudan official website available at  
http://www.gossonline.org/magnoliaPublic/en/about/history.html  (accessed on 23/05/2013). 
32
 The World Bank country overview, South Sudan available at 
.http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southsudan/overview  (accessed on 15/03/2013). 
33
 The struggle for liberation continued for several years, even after Sudan obtained independence in 1956. Thirty-
seven of the past 56 years have been wasted on major civil conflicts; the first from 1955-1972 and the second from 
1983 to 2005 when the (CPA) was signed. In fulfillment of a provision of the CPA, South Sudanese voted for total 
independence during the January 2011 referendum. South Sudan was declared a sovereign state on 9 July 2011. 
South Sudan Government portal available at  
http://www.goss-online.org/magnoliaPublic/en/about/history.html  (accessed on 24/05/2013). 
34
 South Sudan economy profile 2012. Available at 
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Presently, industry and infrastructure in this landlocked country remains severely 
underdeveloped and poverty is still widespread with a high rate of unemployment because the 
formal sectors are yet to develop and there are limited options for alternative employment.35 
Core administrative structures and mechanisms of political representation are only beginning to 
emerge and the government still struggles to provide basic services to the population. Outside a 
few oil enclaves, South Sudan remains a relatively undeveloped, subsistence economy.36 
South Sudan is not a member of the WTO but its independence as a country presents it with an 
opportunity to consider membership. It is likely to face the same challenges and obstacles as 
other developing countries, but it might be in a better position to adopt the WTO’s consistent 
policies now than to adopt a change in the existing policies in the future. However, it must be 
understood that in as much as the WTO may be the eventual resort for obtaining sustainable 
economic development but it may not necessarily at present be the instrument needed for South 
Sudan to attain that goal. This study seeks to stimulate a debate that will help the people of 
South Sudan to understand the benefits and challenges of being a sovereign state in a 
globalised world.  
Studying the accession process, the potential benefits of WTO membership, as well as the 
issues and challenges of tariff adoption and policy reforms from a South Sudan perspective, is 
not only a worthwhile pursuit and of relevance to policy makers and negotiators in South Sudan, 
but may also be of importance to other parties interested in acceding, as well as the acceded 
countries. This is so because the issues that will be examined in this study may arise in other 
countries. This study hopes to be a unique contribution in this field by identifying the major area 
of reforms and articulating the challenges ahead for such reforms. It will also provide a 
contribution to the literature on the subject of accession to the multilateral trading system from 
LDCs and in particular a South Sudan perspective. 
1.4 Research questions 
 
a) What are the legal requirements for South Sudan to accede to the WTO? 
b) What kind of market access commitments are requested of LDCs on accession? 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.indexmundi.com/south_sudan/economy_profile.html (accessed on 13/03/2013). 
35
 The National Baseline Household Survey of 2009 found that more than 50% of the populations are in one way or 
another underemployed, and only 12% hold formal employment. See South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBS) 2012- National Baseline Household Survey of 2009 Report for South Sudan. 
36
 South Sudan economy profile 2012. available at 
.http://www.indexmundi.com/south_sudan/economy_profile.html  (accessed on 13/03/2013). 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
c) What are the potential implications of these market access commitments for  LDCs/ 
d) What are the potential implications of these market access commitments for the 
development of trade in South Sudan? 
e) How can these implications be averted to match the trade and development needs of 
South Sudan? 
1.5 Scope of the research 
 
The subject area under consideration is very broad and therefore a limited but refined scope 
has been adopted. The study will be limited to the effects of the accession process, with specific 
reference to what market access commitments in goods and services an applicant LDC member 
has to undertake. This research will attempt to present an overview of these market access 
commitments and highlight the contending lines of thought. 
A detailed assessment and discussion of the potential implications of South Sudan’s accession 
to the WTO on its economy and trade can hardly be achieved in this thesis owing to the time 
and space limitations. Therefore this study neither extends to a commodity by commodity or 
sector by sector analysis nor purports to quantify the possible costs and benefits of the 
accession. It is limited to the general implications of the WTO’s market access commitments in 
the light of the principal WTO guidelines regulating market access. 
1.6 Methodology 
 
The study is desktop based and coupled with internet based research which has been 
employed extensively in looking for information in different sources, such as, books, relevant 
journals articles, working papers, and reports on accession. 
This study examines the market access commitments in both goods and services in the case of 
six recently acceded countries in a systematic manner. The case studies are conducted in the 
same manner and highlight the same information for each of the six applicants. Each case study 
includes an examination of the WTO produced documents regarding the applicant’s market 
access commitments as well as material published about the same by academic sources. 
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In examining the implications that WTO accession has had on a country, past studies have 
examined a large range of areas from market access, government budget, structural reforms, 
trade and investment, institutional governance and corruption to macroeconomic management 
and have come to the conclusion that each accession is unique and largely governed by 
unwritten rules. In order to begin making some order out of this seemingly chaotic process 
without clear rules, this comparison will highlight the similarities and differences between the six 
recently acceded LDCs versus incumbent WTO members as well as the WTO accession 
guidelines for LDCs and develop a categorisation of accession capacity for a LDC like South 
Sudan and the likely outcomes thereof. 
 
In the context of market access in goods, each recently acceded LDC applicant is assessed by 
examining the level of tariffs to which it bound itself on accession. This is then compared and 
contrasted with those of the other recently acceded LDC and incumbent WTO members, as well 
as the WTO accession guidelines. This is examined using WTO working reports and schedule 
of commitments, existing reports, and articles.  
 
Consequently, there is an examination of the extent of the six recently acceded LDCs’ services 
commitments undertaken on accession. To understand the amount of pressure and influence 
incumbent WTO members exerted on the acceding LDCs, the total number of concessions and 
commitments made out of the total number of services sectors and subsectors as classified 
under the WTO are compared to those of incumbent WTO members and the accession 
guidelines. Each of the service sectors will be examined by looking at what commitments were 
made in each of the four trade modes: Mode 1 (cross-border supply), Mode 2 (consumption 
abroad), Mode 3 (commercial presence), and Mode 4(presence of natural persons). 
 
Consequently there is an examination of the implications for South Sudan meeting the WTO 
market access commitments. The arguments advanced in this section emanates from literature 
review related to recently acceded LDCs and reports, internet sources, development plans and 
legislation enacted by South Sudan. 
1.7 Chapter outline 
 
Chapter 2 looks at the WTO framework and its principles and the accession process, and briefly 
introduces the debate on the decision to expedite LDC accession to this organisation. It finally 
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examines the rationales for LDCs seeking to accede to the WTO and the arguments to the 
contrary.  
Chapter 3 examines whether the WTO incumbent members have lived up to their promise, as 
stated in the accession guidelines for LDCs, to exercise restraint while seeking market access 
commitments from six of the recently acceded LDCs. This is best understood by systematically 
examining the six recently acceded WTO members and incumbent WTO members’ market 
access commitments through the same lens and making a comparison of the results. 
Chapter 4 answers the main questions of this research. It looks at the implications of lowering 
tariffs, and the excessive commitments for South Sudan in light of the difficulties experienced by 
other recently acceded LDCs to the WTO.  
Chapter 5 covers the general conclusion on the findings and provides recommendations on how 
these implications may be averted by South Sudan.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
ACCESSION TO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In general, accession is a formal legal commitment by the acceding country to comply fully with 
multilateral trade rules in order to benefit from gains resulting from previous rounds of 
multilateral trade negotiations. It is the first step in the long, challenging and costly process of 
full integration of least developed countries (LDCs) into the multilateral trading system (MTS). 
The end of this process marks the beginning of the enforcement of commitments and 
concessions as well as compliance with World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules for the acceding 
member.37 
It has been observed that the WTO accession process is becoming more demanding in terms of 
market access commitments and there is a growing concern that the price of joining the WTO 
includes commitments that go beyond the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and 
WTO agreements. 38  Moreover, there is the added concern that this process takes limited 
account of the specific circumstances of applicant countries or their needs for special and 
differential treatment (SDT).39 It is further observed that LDCs are poorly equipped in terms of 
national institutions and human and financial resources; hence their leverage to influence the 
outcome of trade negotiations and their capacity to implement commitments and concessions 
                                                          
37
 Mussie D ‘Accession to the World Trade Organisation: Challenges and prospects for the Least Developed 
Countries’ (2005) 6 The Estey Center Journal of International law & Trade Policy 181-209, 192. (Hereafter Mussie D 
‘Accession to the World Trade Organisation’, 2005). 
38
 For instance, LDCs, such as, Vanuatu, Cambodia and Nepal, were forced to agree to other WTO plus conditions 
during their accession process. Nepal and Cambodia were asked to join the International Union for the Protection 
of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV).  Nepal was further asked to bind other duties and charges (ODCs) at zero and 
make a commitment to phase them out over a two to 10 year period although the GATT itself says only to bind 
them at existing levels but not to reduce them. Vanuatu was asked by the USA to join the Agreement on 
Government Procurement, which is a plurilateral agreement. 
39
 The SDT provisions are a set of agreed rights and privileges that are not part of legally binding commitments 
(except in the case of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property). They grant favourable market access, 
access to technology and longer implementation periods for the Uruguay Round Agreement. They therefore 
constitute a strategic interest for developing and least-developed countries in multilateral trade negotiations, 
previously in the framework of the GATT, and now in the WTO, and are the result of increased participation of 
developing countries in the MTS. 
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are severely limited. 40  Regardless of the challenges above which are responsible for the 
unbalanced outcome of accession negotiations for LDCs, they continue to embark on the 
accession process while weighing the benefits versus the costs of this decision. 
The questions to be answered in this chapter are the following. Firstly, what is the accession 
process? Secondly, what are the key issues and challenges affecting LDCs while embarking on 
this? Thirdly, have the new accession guidelines been of any help whatsoever in hastening the 
accession of LDCs into this Multilateral Trading System (MTS)? Finally, what are the rationales 
for LDCs accession to the WTO? 
In order to answer these questions, the section first looks at the WTO and its key principles and 
agreements; the second section looks at the accession process; the third section includes the 
WTO accession guidelines for LDCs; and lastly, there is an examination of the rationale for 
WTO accession by LDCs. 
2.2 The WTO and its key principles 
 
Before the establishment of the WTO, the GATT was the only multilateral framework for 
administering international trade.41 However, the WTO now incorporates and administers the 
GATT and its provisions.42 The Uruguay Round gave rise to two new multilateral agreements 
including the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which deal with forms of trade and 
issues that were previously beyond the scope of the GATT.43 Agreements covering government 
procurement, trade in civil aircraft, trade in bovine meat, and trade in dairy products are also 
known as plurilateral agreements.44 The Marrakesh agreements also consist of several other 
                                                          
40
 Rolf J L and Matthias L ‘WTO Accession and Negotiation Issues for Vulnerable Economies’. (2000) 1. 
41
 The WTO Agreement of 1994. 
42
 The GATT 1994 is composed of the provisions originally found in the GATT 1947 (including subsequent 
amendments, protocols, decisions, and understandings, as well as the Marrakesh Protocol to GATT 1994). It is now 
incorporated into Annex 1 of the WTO Agreement. The other multilateral agreements annexed to the WTO cover a 
wide range of areas, including: TRIPS; Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS); and Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
measures (SPS Agreement). For the complete  annex see  
http://www.org.wto.org/english/doc_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#finalact 
43
 Hoekman B ‘Proposals for WTO Reform: A Synthesis and Assessment’ (2011) 20 Minnesota Journal of 
International Law. 324-364, see generally. 
44
 A plurilateral agreement is binding only on countries that sign the agreement whereas multilateral agreements 
are binding on all countries who agree to be members of the WTO. 
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agreements and understandings annexed to it,45 and any acceding state will be required to 
commit itself to all the multilateral agreements administered under the WTO, and all at the same 
time. These agreements are thus referred to as forming what it is known as a ‘single 
undertakings’ package that allows no room to select that which one desires.46 
 
Most of the WTO agreements are the result of the 1986-94 Uruguay Round negotiations, and 
were signed at the Marrakesh ministerial meeting in April 1994.47 The primary responsibilities of 
the WTO are: to provide a forum for multilateral trade negotiations and a framework for their 
implementation, to administer the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, (TPRM), and to administer 
the Dispute Settlement Procedures (DSPs). 48  The TPRM is both a function and a set of 
procedures that enable the WTO to monitor the trade policies of member countries.49 The 
dispute settlement function is a set of procedures that detail how a WTO member can initiate a 
complaint against the trade practices of another member and how this dispute is to be 
processed and ultimately resolved.50 
 
All the above WTO laws are based on certain core principles and rules. Three of the key 
principles underlying the WTO are those of non-discrimination, predictability, and transparency. 
Non-discrimination is ensured through the following two core principles: most favoured nation 
(MFN) treatment and national treatment. 
The Most Favoured Nation(MFN) principle obligates contracting parties to accord immediately 
and unconditionally benefits and privilege to like products originating from, or destined for the 
                                                          
45
 See The WTO Agreement of 1994. Other agreements and understandings annexed thereto include:  
Annex -1A Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods: GATT 1994, Agreements on: Agriculture, Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures, Textiles Clothing (terminated on 1 January 2005), Technical Barriers to Trade, Trade-
Related Investment Measures(TRIMs), Anti-dumping (Article VI of GATT 1994), Customs valuation (Article VII of 
GATT 1994),Preshipment Inspection, Rules of Origin, Import Licensing, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 
Safeguards; 
Annex- 1B General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS);  
Annex-1C Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS);  
Annex- 2 Dispute Settlement Understanding;  
Annex- 3 Trade Policy Review Mechanism; and  
Annex- 4 Plurilateral Trade Agreements. 
46
 Michalopoulos C ‘WTO Accession’ in Hoekman B, Mattoo A & English P (eds.) Development, Trade and the WTO: 
A Hand Book (2002) 65. 
47
 WTO- Learning Guide ‘Trade and Development’ (2012) 15. 
48
 The WTO Agreement of 1994. 
49
 The Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) Agreement. 
50
 The WTO Agreement of 1994. 
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territories of all other contracting states. 51  It ensures non-discrimination between trading 
partners. The MFN principle refers to any country and not only to WTO members. In other 
words, the advantages not only concern those granted by WTO members to other members, but 
also those granted to non-WTO members.52  The MFN principle applies to like products; a 
concept which is fundamental to the principle. This means that different or unlike products may 
be treated differently.53 
National treatment requires that foreign goods, once inside the borders of a country, be treated 
the same as domestically produced goods.54 Hence this principle ensures non-discrimination 
between domestic and foreign products, services or nationals.55 For trade in goods, it prohibits a 
Member from favouring its domestic products over the imported like products of other Members 
once imported products have entered the domestic market.56  The objective of the national 
treatment principle is to provide equality of competitive conditions for imported products and 
limit the use of domestic policies that restrict trade.  
The principle of predictability in the WTO is achieved through the basic ethos of binding and 
enforceable commitments. Liberalisation commitments and agreements to abide by certain rules 
of the game are of little value if they cannot be enforced. The WTO ensures that when countries 
open their markets to goods on the basis of the concessions they offer, they are bound by their 
commitments. The member concerned can therefore not unilaterally choose to change its 
commitments or concessions without negotiating compensation with the other principal 
suppliers of the products concerned. The MFN rule further ensures that such compensation, 
which is usually in the form of reductions of other tariffs, extends to all WTO members, raising 
the cost of such reneging actions. Predictability is further enhanced by the WTO DSPs that are 
available to members to bring any disputes against members who fail to abide by their 
commitments and violate the WTO disciplines.  
 
Lastly, there is the principle of transparency which is a basic pillar of the WTO. It is a legal 
obligation provided in the WTO legal texts.57 It requires WTO members to publish their trade 
regulations, establish and maintain institutions that review their administrative decisions 
                                                          
51
 The Legal Texts of the World Trade Organisation, Art 1(1) GATTS 1994. 
52
 The GATT Art 1 of 1994. 
53
 The GATT Art 1(1) of 1994. 
54
 The GATT Art III of 1994. 
55
 The GATT Art III of 1994. 
56
 The GATT Art III (2) of 1994. 
57
 The GATT Art X, GATS Art III, TRIPS Art 63. 
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affecting trade. Moreover, members are required to respond to requests for information by other 
members and notify changes in trade policies to the WTO. 58  These internal transparency 
requirements are supplemented by multilateral surveillance of trade policies by WTO members, 
facilitated by periodic country specific reports that are prepared by the WTO Secretariat and 
discussed by the WTO General Council. The external surveillance also fosters transparency, 
both for citizens of the countries concerned and for trading partners. It reduces the scope for 
countries to circumvent their obligations, thereby reducing uncertainty regarding the prevailing 
policy stance; and the legitimacy of the WTO is further enhanced when citizens access 
information and know what it does. 
2.3 The WTO accession process  
 
Accession is governed by Art XII of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO, which 
defines in highly general terms the rules for accession to the WTO.59 It states: 
‘Any state or customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external 
commercial relations [...] may accede to [the WTO...] on terms agreed between it and 
the WTO.’60 
The accession process is the same for all countries, no matter what their development status.61 
However, the specific terms of accession must be negotiated between the WTO members and 
the applicant country because each accession is a negotiation between the WTO members and 
a particular country with typically different economic conditions. Hence each accession is 
unique. 
The WTO Secretariat, in consultation with WTO members, has drawn up a set of procedures for 
accession which are closely modeled on those followed by contracting parties to the GATT.62 
These procedures require the following steps discussed below. 
                                                          
58
 The GATT Art X, GATS Art III, TRIPS Art 63. 
59
 Article XII of the WTO Agreement of 1994. 
60
 Article XII of the WTO Agreement of 1994. 
61
 Hawthorne H ‘Acceding to the Norm: Accession to the WTO by LDCs’ (2009) 4 The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 7-
35, 26. (Hereafter Hawthorne H ‘Acceding to the Norm: Accession to the WTO by LDCs’, 2009). 
62
 WTO Secretariat, Accession to the World Trade Organisation, Procedures for Negotiations under Article XII, 
WT/ACC/1 (Mar. 24, 1995). Available at http://www.wto.org  (accessed on 20/03/2013). 
 (Hereinafter WTO Accession Procedures).  
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An applicant must send a communication to the director general of the WTO indicating its desire 
to accede to the WTO under Art XII.63 Once the acceding country has made a formal request 
and the WTO members have accepted the request, a working party, which would facilitate the 
accession of that particular country, is established.64 The accession process involves four main 
phases. 
The first phase is submission of a memorandum of foreign trade regime (MOFTR), which 
explains the acceding country’s trade related laws and policies.65 If the working party is satisfied 
with the content and explanations of the MOFTR, it will initiate bilateral trade negotiations 
between the acceding country and individual WTO members, which then becomes the second 
phase in the accession process. 66 
The negotiations would essentially be about market access concessions and commitments. The 
market access in goods includes the negotiation of concessions in the area of trade in goods 
mainly in the form of reduced and bound import tariffs.67 These negotiations are carried out 
bilaterally with the main trading partners who are the principal and substantive suppliers to an 
acceding country. These concessions are extended on an unconditional MFN basis to all other 
WTO members, including commitments in agriculture, such as, market access, export 
subsidies, and domestic support.68 
Market access in the services track involves the negotiation of commitments on trade in 
services, which are also conducted bilaterally and result in a schedule of specific commitments 
which are annexed to the Protocol of Accession.69 
The WTO Agreements and other multilateral trade agreements are not subject to negotiations 
as they constitute what is called ‘single market access negotiations’ which would lead to the 
                                                          
63
 The WTO Agreement of 1994. 
64
 WTO Accession: Explanation on how to become a member of the WTO.  
Available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/acces_e.htm  (accessed on 28/01/2013). 
65
 WTO Accession: Explanation on how to become a member of the WTO.  
Available at  http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/acces_e.htm  (accessed on 28/01/2013). 
66
 It is understood that fact-finding work on the foreign trade regime and the negotiating phase can overlap and 
proceed in parallel. 
67
 Handbook on the accession to the WTO: Chapter 4. Available at  
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/cbt_course_e/c4s1p1_e.htm  (accessed on 20/03/2013). 
68
 Handbook on the accession to the WTO: Chapter 4. Available at  
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/cbt_course_e/c4s1p1_e.htm  (accessed on 20/03/2013). 
69
 Handbook on the accession to the WTO: Chapter 4. Available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/cbt_course_e/c4s1p1_e.htm(accessed on 20/03/2013). 
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third phase of the accession process, the drafting of the terms of the membership in the 
Protocol of Accession and Schedule of Commitments.70 
The fourth and final phase of the accession process is the decision stage.71 The decision to 
admit an applicant to the WTO lies with the Ministerial Conference or the General Council, and it 
shall be made by consensus, or failing such, by a two-thirds majority vote.72 If the decision is in 
favour of the applicant state, the applicant will become a fully-fledged member of the WTO 
within 30 days after the acceding country ratifies the Protocol of Accession.73 
2.3.1 Accession process for developed countries and LDCs 
 
Although the procedure to be followed during accession looks fairly straightforward, acceding 
countries have often complained about the long, drawn-out process of accession.74 The WTO 
accession process has been considered problematic for several reasons as indicated below. 
First is the constructive ambiguity in the legal provision dealing with the accession process. As 
is stated in Art XII of the GATT, WTO accession is indefinitely open to any state or customs 
territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations and other 
matters provided for in the WTO Agreement.75 This provision, however, fails to lay down a clear 
guideline as to the terms of WTO accession, which leaves an acceding country at the mercy of 
the incumbent members. In relation to this, international trade analysts, such as Evenett and 
Braga, have therefore stated: 
‘Paradoxically for rules based organisation, the WTO has no clear rules for the price of 
membership. Article XII of the Marrakesh Agreement, the legal instrument covering the 
WTO accession process, merely states that new members may join the WTO on terms 
                                                          
70
 Handbook on the accession to the WTO: Chapter 4. Available at  
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/cbt_course_e/c4s1p1_e.htm(accessed on 20/03/2013). 
71
 Handbook on the accession to the WTO: Chapter 4. Available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/cbt_course_e/c4s1p1_e.htm (accessed on 20/03/2013). 
72
 In practice, however, a decision is adopted on the basis of consensus. In GATT or WTO, there have been no cases 
of voting on accessions. See Art XII (2) of the WTO Agreement of 1994. 
73
Hawthorne H ‘Acceding to the Norm: Accession to the WTO by LDCs’ (2009) 4 The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 7-
35, 27. 
74
 Pandey P R, Adhikari R & Wagle S ‘Nepal’s Accession to the WTO’ (United Nations Department of Economic 
Social Affairs’ Policy and Research paper 2011) 6. (Hereafter Pandey P R et al ‘Nepal’s accession to the WTO’, 
2011). Available at http://www.sawtee.org/Research_Reports/R2011-03.pdf  (accessed on 12/05/2013). 
75
 Article XII of the WTO Agreement of 1994. 
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to be agreed.76This sparse guidance leaves the door wide open to encompass both an 
expedited hassle-free accession process and a drawn-out, decade-long, and 
burdensome accession experience.’77 
Secondly, WTO coverage has expanded since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of 
negotiations to consist of the ‘single undertaking’78 and the inclusion of agriculture, services and 
intellectual property rights. 79  The acceding countries are now being requested to provide 
information on all laws pertaining to these new issues as well as the older areas, and are also 
being required to show their institutional and legal capacities to conduct international trade in a 
manner that will meet their commitments.80 This includes ensuring that their government trading 
agencies operate transparently without special monopoly rights.81 
Thirdly, there are few rules for the accession process. This is so because the accession process 
has developed since the GATT days, with countries now required to submit information to the 
WTO about their trade regime, as well as to take part in both multilateral and bilateral 
negotiations. It is argued that the lack of rules in the accession process, combined with 
multilateral and bilateral negotiations, have consequently made the accession process power 
based rather than rules and law based.82 
Fourthly, incumbent countries pressure acceding countries to take on commitments which go 
beyond their WTO treaty obligations and they are also compelled to liberalise their markets 
                                                          
76
 Article XII of the WTO Agreement of 1994. 
77
 Evenett J S & Primo-Braga A C ‘WTO Accession: Lessons from Experience’ (published paper, World Bank Group 
2005)2. Available at 
 http://www.agri-peri.ir/AKHBAR/anserson/WTO%20Accession-Braga0405.pdf  
(accessed on 03/03/2013). (Hereafter Evenett J S & Primo-Braga AC WTO Accession 2005). 
78
 According to the 'single undertaking' approach, adopted during the Uruguay Round, all Multilateral Trade 
Agreements concluded during a negotiation round shall be adopted as a whole (i.e. as a single package).  As a 
result, these Agreements have binding effects on all WTO Members. 
79
 Bosworth R & Duncan R ‘Current status of the WTO accession process and the experience of ESCAP acceding 
countries’. Available at 
https://www.google.co.za/search?q=Bosworth+R+%26+Duncan+R+Current+status+of+the+WTO+accession+proces
s+and+the+experience+of+ESCAP+acceding+countries  (accessed on 11/10/2012). 
80
 Bosworth R & Duncan R ‘Current status of the WTO accession process and the experience of ESCAP acceding 
countries’. Available at 
https://www.google.co.za/search?q=Bosworth+R+%26+Duncan+R+Current+status+of+the+WTO+accession+proces
s+and+the+experience+of+ESCAP+acceding+countries  (accessed on 11/10/2012). 
81
 WTO agreements do not explicitly require a fundamental market economy, members are imposing this 
requirement de facto on acceding countries as part of their leverage in the accession process 
82
 Nguyen N (2009) 243. 
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more than the current members.83 This is regardless of the stage of development and capacity 
of the applicant country.84 It is suggested that acceding countries should accede on terms that 
are broadly comparable both for applicant countries among themselves and in comparison with 
incumbent members, although this is not the case in practice.85 For instance, there is pressure 
on new members to sign all plurilateral agreements without properly addressing the question of 
whether this practice serves the interests of the acceding country or not. In reporting on 
discussions in the General Council, Naray noted:  
‘A number of developing countries delegations recalled that in the accession process 
reasonable conditions were required of and imposed  on, applicants because developed 
country members had requested that acceding countries accept more stringent 
conditions and a higher level of commitment than was required from members  
themselves. For example, the requirement to adhere to several plurilateral agreements, 
to guarantee full transparency and objectivity and that markets access commitments 
should be about the same as those made by countries at similar level of development.’86 
In addition to the frequently extensive trade liberalisation requested of potential members, it is 
argued that the time taken to finalise accession packages can become lengthy due to the 
unwillingness on the part of applicants to make sufficiently liberal commitments and the 
dissatisfaction of some members with the level of commitments made by the applicant.87 
Lastly, acceding members are often encouraged to agree to shorter implementation periods 
than existing WTO members.88 For example, Cape Verde and Vanuatu waived the transition 
period for the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs). 89  Transitional 
periods have not been automatically extended to DCs and LDCs are required to meet WTO 
requirements on accession.90 It was in light of the above hardships experienced by LDCs that 
                                                          
83
 Pandey P R et al ‘Nepal’s Accession to the WTO’ (2011) 7. 
84
 This situation is known as 'WTO-plus', with acceding members made to liberalise markets more than existing 
WTO members. 
85
 Pandey P R et al ‘Nepal’s Accession to the WTO’ (2011) 7. 
86
 Naray P Russia and the World Trade Organisation (2001) 4. 
87
 Hawthorne H ‘Acceding to the Norm: Accession to the WTO by LDCs’ (2009) 25. 
88
 Both Nepal and Cambodia committed themselves to fully implementing the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMs), waiving the seven-year transition period allowed for LDCs under it. 
89
 WTO, Cape Verde Working Party Report, document no. WT/ACC/CPV/30, 2007, 39; and WTO, Vanuatu Working 
Party Report, document no. WT/ACC/VUT/ 13, 2001, 22. 
90
 Bosworth R & Duncan R ‘Current status of the WTO accession process and the experience of ESCAP acceding 
countries’.  Available  at 
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the WTO members agreed to create special guidelines for LDCs that would expedite their 
accession process. 
2.3.2 Decision to expedite the accession of LDCs to the WTO 
 
In recognising the special needs of LDCs, the Doha Declaration of 2001 called for the facilitation 
and acceleration of the accession negotiations with LDCs, and in December 2002, the General 
Council adopted Guidelines on the Accession of LDCs for simplified and streamlined accession 
procedures with a view to concluding negotiations as quickly as possible.91 The Guidelines were 
also intended to help to limit to a greater extent the possibility of imposing unfair conditions on 
LDCs. However, since acceding countries have little or no leverage over existing WTO 
members, it is submitted that there is not much that they can do to make sure that all these 
promises are fulfilled. According to the Guidelines, WTO members have to give more 
consideration to the specific needs of acceding LDCs particularly in the following areas: market 
access, WTO rules process, trade related assistance, and capacity building. These same 
considerations should also be given after accession.92 
 
However, in the three years between the adoption of the 2002 Accession Guidelines and the 
Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in 2005, only two LDCs, Cambodia and Nepal, acceded to 
the WTO. At the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, ministers once again reaffirmed their 
commitment in para 47 of the Declaration: 
‘We agree to facilitate and accelerate negotiations with acceding LDCs based on the 
accession guidelines adopted by the General Council in December 2002. We commit to 
continue giving our attention and priority to concluding the ongoing accession 
proceedings as rapidly as possible’.93 
After the eighth Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in 2005, four more LDCs, Cape Verde, 
Samoa, Laos and Vanuatu, acceded to the WTO, while nine more are still negotiating to join the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
https://www.google.co.za/search?q=Bosworth+R+%26+Duncan+R+Current+status+of+the+WTO+accession+proces
s+and+the+experience+of+ESCAP+acceding+countries  (accessed on 11/10/2012). 
91
 Handbook on accession to the WTO; chapter 2.Accessed from  
www.to.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/cbt-course_e/c2s4p1_e.htm  (accessed on 28/01/2013). 
92
WTO document WT/L/508 of January 20, 2003. 
93
 Handbook on the accession to the WTO: Chapter 4. Available at  
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/cbt_course_e/c4s1p1_e.htm  (accessed on 20/03/2013). 
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WTO.94 Pleas and declarations have continually been made since then for WTO members to 
fully and faithfully adhere to the letter and spirit of the WTO Accession Guidelines adopted by 
the General Council.95 
Thus, with a view to further strengthening the 2002 LDC Accession Guidelines, new accession 
guidelines were agreed upon in July 2012. But these 2012 Guidelines have been perceived to 
do more harm than good to LDCs based on the fact that they still fail to address the onerous 
obligations placed on new applicants by incumbent members. The various concerns hinge on 
the following areas; benchmarks for goods, transitional periods, services, special and differential 
treatment, and accession rules, and technical assistance.96 
Seen in the light of the experience of the LDCs which have acceded to the WTO, 97  the 
arguments posed by the 2012 Guidelines are regarded as being extremely optimistic 
speculations, as some commentators such as Adhikari and Dahal concluded after observing 
that, LDCs’ accession process continues to be highly protracted, politically demanding and 
frustrating.98 
This slow progress and lack of visible reforms have garnered great cynicism around the 
accession process, and in fact Grynberg and Joy argue that it is the extraordinarily naïve who 
would believe that the system of accession will eventually be reformed.99 True to this view, it is 
submitted that, there has been a lack by the GATT/WTO, over the years since its formation to 
exert seriousness and urgency to strengthen and implement the special and differential status of 
the LDC in the multilateral trading regime. Moreover, despite their plights there has been a 
failure to conduct negotiations for accession in a way that ensures that the interest of the LDC is 
best served. Unless these initiatives come to pass, it is hardly impossible not to share in 
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 These are Afghanistan, Bhutan, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Liberia, Sao Tome and Principe, Sudan,  
and Yemen 
95
 LDC Trade Ministers’ declarations were made in Dhaka (in 2003), Maseru (in 2008) and Dar Es Salam (in 2009), 
96
 Accession of Least Developed Countries; WTO WT/COMTD/LDC/21 6 JULY 2012 (12-3621). 
97
 It took LDCs: Nepal 14 years, Cambodia almost 9 years, and Vietnam about 12 years to complete their WTO 
accession. As will be considered later, neither are their terms of accession do not seem to have been driven by the 
spirit of the differential treatment purported by the above Declaration and decision. Out of the 48  LDCs save for 
the 30 original members that joined prior to 1995, only 6 have acceded to the WTO whereas eight more remain in 
the process of accession. 
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Cambodia and Vanuatu’ Published by the South Asia Watch on Trade, Economics & Environment (SAWTEE) 
available at http://www.un-ngls.org/SAWTEE.doc. (accessed on 23/10/2012). 
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Grynberg and Joy’s cynicism towards the WTO. They further assert the following reasons for 
their cynicism. First, those countries that are in the process of accession are outside the WTO 
system and hence play no part in reforming the process.100 It is argued that they therefore 
instead resort to engaging in negotiating specific terms with incumbent members knowing that a 
general debate is unlikely to lead to an agreed result that would ease the burden on them as 
aspirant member countries.101 Secondly, they submit that since those inside the system stand to 
gain little, they are unlikely to be willing to expend the scarce political capital available in 
soliciting for reforms of the system.102 Finally, it is further feared that once the aspirant countries 
join the WTO, they may seek to exercise their new-found power and demand concessions from 
other acceding countries, and this is something that the incumbent countries do not desire.103 
It is therefore argued that the major fault line lies in the fact that, the principal objectives of trade 
negotiators is to extract concessions from their trading partners and they are less likely to 
abandon this by following the Guidelines of the General Council, which can be viewed as 
nothing but a set of best endeavour clauses.104 
2.4 Rationales for joining the WTO 
In spite of the obstacles mentioned, there are several good reasons for LDCs to join the WTO 
and for current WTO members to support this process. Among the most important five reasons 
that will be discussed below are the following: accession to the WTO will enhance economic 
development in LDCs, increase Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), encourage market access, 
enhance dispute settlement, and encourage effective domestic policy making and institutions. 
2.4.1 The WTO accession and economic development 
Trade liberalisation is undoubtedly one of the things expected to come out of the WTO 
accession process. Economists continue to argue about, and conduct research into, the 
connection between trade liberalisation and economic growth, but no concrete and clear answer 
has been given so far to the question whether trade liberalisation leads to economic growth.105 
For the WTO, however, it is noted that the answer to this question is in the affirmative. 
Accession encourages trade liberalisation, and this in turn stimulates economic growth which is 
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104
 Pandey P R et al (2011) 4. 
105
 Spanu V ‘Liberalisation of the International Trade and Economic growth (2003) 2. 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
good news for employment. 106 Achieving higher living standards, full employment and 
sustainable development are the aims of the WTO’s member governments, as expressed in the 
WTO’s founding Marrakesh Agreement. The means through which these are achievable is by 
opening up countries’ trade markets through a substantial reduction of tariffs and other 
obstacles to trade.107 
An open market policy will enable a country to exploit its position of comparative advantage. 
Ricardo showed that when countries are encouraged to each specialise in what they are good 
at and in what they produce and export at comparatively lower costs, all parties end up 
benefiting.108  Specialisation through international trade, as every country finds some export 
activities to earn the foreign currencies needed to pay for necessary imports.109 It is further 
noted that this rationale of specialisation and international trade is more beneficial to small 
economies because exporting to world markets increases opportunities to trade and allows 
them to benefit from economies of scale which then boosts economic growth.110 Economic 
theory and evidence underline the importance of export led growth. Such growth is most 
effective when it concentrates on sectors in which the country has a competitive advantage, 
meaning that it can produce those goods at relatively lower opportunity costs than its trading 
partners.111 
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 See the 7
th
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2.4.2 The WTO accession and secure market access 
 
The second rationale for acceding to the WTO is that governments are able to obtain an 
improved access to markets for their exports.112 The MFN rates of the acceding countries’ trade 
partners are not affected by accession, but rather that the acceding countries are able to benefit 
from all commitments made by signatories to the WTO Agreements in future trade 
negotiations.113 
WTO membership may urge LDCs to liberalise market access for imports, although they are not 
necessarily required to do so as a result of the special and differential treatment extended to 
them. It is argued that reducing the implicit tax on exports will also stimulate export 
diversification and boost FDI inflows.114 
It is argued that by staying outside the WTO, discriminatory tariffs would be applied by the 
countries’ trade partners against the non-members and the non-members would further be 
exposed to the undue negotiating strengths of their partners bilaterally or regionally when 
negotiating border measures.115 As far as the interests of small countries are concerned, the 
MTS plays a significant role, for these countries have a limited power to exploit their small size 
to improve their terms of trade.116 Their impact on terms of trade maybe enhanced if terms of 
trade are negotiated at a multilateral level.117 
Moreover, as far as accessing other members’ markets is concerned, LDCs have been granted 
preferential access to developed country markets under such schemes as the Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP),118 the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA),119 and The 
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European Union’s (EU) Everything but Arms (EBA) initiative which provides the LDCs’ products 
duty free and quota free access to some of the most lucrative markets of the EU except arms 
and ammunitions, without any quantitative restrictions. It may therefore be argued that LDCs 
accession to the WTO may not bring about major changes in terms of bolstering access to such 
markets after all. 
A question that arises is what then is the relevance of LDCs acceding to the WTO if there is the 
option of the preferential market access? In an attempt to answer this, it has been noted that 
these preferential schemes bear unfavourable characteristics, such as, being time limited and 
unpredictable in that they can be unilaterally changed without the country doing so being in 
violation of any legal norms except for bilateral treaties if any exist.120 This undoubtedly projects 
an unfavorable image to anyone wishing to do business within such a country.121  But on the 
other hand, WTO commitments are more legally binding and any breach could result in legal 
consequences.122 Such legal certainty and the threat of dispute settlement provided by the WTO 
therefore guarantee secure market access. The gains therefore, are rather in the transparency, 
stability and security of these market access conditions. 
2.4.3 The WTO accession and domestic policy making and institutions 
 
Acceding countries are required to put in place a set of norms and institutions, which support 
the liberalisation of markets, increase transparency, and promote the rule of law, contract 
enforcement and the evolution of an independent judicial system. In principle, nothing would 
prevent governments from putting in place these norms and regulations on a unilateral basis. 
But the role the WTO plays is to facilitate  the introduction of effective reforms not only by 
reinforcing the credibility of the government's trade policies but also by helping to introduce  
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policies that are based on best practice and that must be harmonized.123This is illustrated by 
evidence that acceding economies’ trade regimes vary considerably, as many have established 
regimes with relative low tariffs and no significant formal non-tariff barriers. For such countries 
therefore, WTO membership provides the opportunity to lock in these regimes to assume legally 
binding obligations regarding tariff levels. This not only permits them to enjoy the benefits of 
liberal trade but also gives them a first line of defense against the domestic protectionist 
pressures that are present in all market economies. 
2.4.4 The WTO accession and FDI 
 
The question most frequently asked is what role WTO membership and consequent trade 
liberalisation plays on the flow of FDI. It is argued that locking in trade liberalisation through 
bound tariffs and domestic support stabilises expectations and reduces the uncertainty 
associated with unexpected changes in policy.124 This then creates a favourable regulatory 
environment which sends a positive signal to foreign investors about a country’s commitment to 
open up its economy.125 The role that the WTO plays is as an insurance mechanism for the 
investors through its transparency and nondiscriminatory126 principles enshrined in the WTO 
legal texts and its Trade Policy Reviews which further help to minimize trade policy induced 
uncertainty.127 Such uncertainty is associated with lower investment and growth rates and with a 
shift in resources toward non-tradeables.128  This, in turn, encourages the inflow of foreign 
investment and technological know-how.  
 
2.4.5 The WTO accession and securing enforcement 
 
It is submitted that all the four arguments mentioned above cannot render the required 
outcomes on LDCs seeking accession if the WTO members could free ride and easily renege 
on their WTO commitments. As soon as a country does not abide by WTO rules, the expected 
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gains from joining the WTO as well as the expected gains from abiding by the rules both 
become moot. Protectionist pressures may resume, investors may be deterred, and expected 
gains turn into losses. But the WTO’s DSB, by securing enforcement and deterring free ride 
behaviour by countries, limits these behaviours and secures the expected gains for any 
member.129 
 
Access to an impartial and binding dispute settlement mechanism whose decisions have a 
significant chance of being enforced is one of the most important potential benefits from WTO 
accession for smaller and weaker countries.130 This is so because there are very few effective 
vehicles to resolve international trading disputes apart from commercial arbitration, and those 
that exist seldom rule in favour of small and vulnerable trading nations. The WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism provides a uniquely fair, accessible and effective opportunity for each 
WTO member. 
 
However, despite these positive reasons to join the WTO, there still appears to be dissent 
concerning the cost of accession for DCs and LDCs as discussed next.  
2.5 Dissent over the real costs of accession  
 
The above arguments provide reasonable assumptions as to why LDCs may decide to join the 
WTO. However, before such a decision is made, the assumptions still need to be carefully 
examined; indeed, they present an uneven picture when confronted with an empirical 
assessment of the record of LDCs once accession has occurred. Some of the expected effects 
may culminate or even disappear. The dissenting views on four of the most important effects 
already introduced above, viz, economic development, securing market access, foreign direct 
investment, and dispute settlement enforcement, are now examined. 
2.5.1 Economic development 
 
The most contentious argument is whether WTO membership does indeed promote economic 
growth and development among LDCs. It is argued that WTO membership does not 
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automatically guarantee that the benefits of multilateral trade will be apportioned equitably, 
especially with respect to DCs or LDCs. Furthermore, parts of the GATT/WTO package have 
the potential to directly undermine the development objectives of LDCs.131 The flawed design of 
the GATT historically and the birth of the WTO with new instruments damaging to the 
development objectives of poor countries are listed as reasons for this argument.132 
 
Over the lifetime of the GATT/WTO, there have been notable responses to address the plight of 
developing countries and to try and fill the lacunae in development. First, there was the 
amendment of GATT Article XVIII by the1954-55 GATT Review Session which was aimed at the 
relaxation of the conditions under which developing countries could take measures for infant 
industry protection as well as for balance of payments purposes.133 Its aim was to provide 
flexibility for developing countries to assist in their economic development. Secondly, in 1964, 
there was the addition of Part IV to the GATT by the Committee on Trade and Development 
which recognised the special needs of developing countries in the trading system, but much of 
the language was in ‘best endeavours’ terms.134  Thirdly, there was the introduction of the 
Generalised System of Preferences(GSP) in 1971 on the basis of a temporary waiver from the 
MFN principle, which was later put on a permanent legal foundation as the Enabling Clause as 
part of the Tokyo Round agreements in 1979. 135  The clause established the principle of 
differential and more favourable treatment, reciprocity, and fuller participation of developing 
countries. It provided for: (i) the preferential market access of developing countries to developed 
country markets on a non-reciprocal, non-discriminatory basis; (ii) 'more favourable' treatment 
for developing countries in other GATT rules dealing with non-tariff barriers; (iii) the introduction 
of preferential trade regimes between developing countries; and (iv) the special treatment of 
LDCs in the context of specific measures for developing countries. 
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This process continued with the establishment of the WTO whose objectives include: raising 
living standards, full employment, steadily growing real income and effective demand, 
expanding production and trade in goods and services, and allowing optimal use of the world's 
resources in accordance with sustainable development.136  The WTO members also further 
indicated their intention to fulfill these objectives in a manner consistent with the respective 
needs and concerns of the parties taking into account their different levels of development. In 
addition, the WTO Agreement recognises the need for positive efforts designed to ensure that 
developing countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the 
growth of international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development.137 
 
However, while trade and development objectives appear central to the objectives of the WTO 
and the means by which it seeks to fulfill those objectives, in practice many of the specific 
provisions are couched in ‘best endeavours’ terms that have little legal force.138 This is one of 
the main reasons for the disillusionment that many developing countries have manifest in 
relation to the results of the Uruguay Round. Most notably they have argued that the expected 
benefits were not realized. For instance the back loading or the application of special 
safeguards, rules of origin and anti-dumping measures in the Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing have offset the promised gains.139 They argue that inadequate account was taken of 
the time, cost and capacity required to meet WTO commitments for example in Customs 
Valuation or TRIMS. The Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) is expensive and requires 
considerable expertise to use, and controversy has been stirred by certain decisions of the DSB 
and Appellate Body. The TRIPS agreement is widely recognised to have posed a considerable 
burden on developing countries while protecting the interests of developed countries. 140 
Developing countries agreed to the TRIPS in exchange for developed country commitments to 
liberalise agriculture and textiles but the result is instead a regime that strives to keep 
developing countries at a state of economic subjection. 141  Despite the eight rounds of 
                                                          
136
 See preamble of the WTO Agreement of 1994. 
137
 See preamble of the WTO Agreement of 1994. 
138
 Laird S, Turrini A & Safadi R ‘The WTO and Development’ 2001 The Political Economy of Policy Reform 221-262; 
223. (Hereafter Laird S et al ‘The WTO and Development’, 2001) 
139
 Laird S et al ‘The WTO and Development’ (2001) 223. 
140
 As Finger puts it, intellectual property came into the Uruguay Round agenda ‘At the insistence of developed 
country industries…Few delegates or analysts appreciated the size of the liability TRIPS would create for 
intellectual property users.’  Finger M ‘Review essay’ (2007) 6 World Trade Review 139. 
141
 Templeman L S ’Intellectual Property’ (1998) Journal of International Economic Law 603-606,605. Moreover N. 
Birdsall, et al argue: ‘Currently, the developed world uses international trade agreements to impose costly and 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
multilateral negotiations, tariff and non-tariff barriers remain heavily stacked against the exports 
of the developing countries. In short, there is a view that, despite the stated objectives, the WTO 
is systemically biased against development.142 
 
2.5.2 Securing market access 
 
Some of the sharpest criticisms of DCs and LDCs target the trade policies of developed 
countries. The areas of concern in this regard relate to tariff peaks and escalation in both 
industrial and agricultural sectors, the erosion of special preferences for LDCs, and growing 
threats from standards and technical barriers.143 
The main obstacles to the exports of sub-Saharan African countries and LDCs appear to be in 
the non-tariff areas of sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) and technical barrier to trade (TBT) 
measures.144  Both the WTO agreements in these areas, though designed in good faith to 
ensure food safety and animal and plant health protection,145 and the arbitrary use of these 
measures by developed countries have resulted in an increase in restrictions to trade. 146 
Developed countries, due to the availability of resources and superior technology, are able to 
enhance their product standards and tend to fix stringent and high SPS and TBT standards. On 
the other hand, LDCs, due to the scarcity of public resources to finance compliance with these 
stringent standards, find that market access of their products in developed countries’ markets 
has become restricted.147 
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These SPS and TBT measures are amongst the most common non-tariff barriers that have 
been identified as restricting market access of LDCs’ products, whilst tariff peaks and escalation 
have been identified as some of the tariff barriers that do the same. ‘Tariff peaks’ are defined as 
exceptionally high tariffs imposed on certain products, especially those that the government 
considers as sensitive, with intent to protect an importing country's industry.148 Such tariffs on a 
country's vital exports could negatively impact that country's international trade, as such higher 
tariffs in developed countries denies access of LDCs’ goods or allows access at relatively higher 
costs.149 ‘Tariff escalation’ on the other hand, is a situation where a country levies low duties on 
materials imported for use by a domestic industry and high duties on imports equivalent to that 
industry's finished products. This has the potential of reducing demand for processed imports 
from developing countries and hampering diversification into higher value-added exports, thus 
compelling them to continue to heavily depend on primary goods.150 
 
As stated above in section 2.4.2 developing countries and LDCs currently have practically duty 
free access to European and North American markets under the GSP regimes, but their main 
concern is that multilateral liberalisation will cause the erosion of these special preferences.151 
The MFN trade reforms at unilateral or at multilateral levels play the role of lowering market 
access barriers and other protection measures for exports from the LDCs’ competitors, thereby 
reducing the advantages of the preference receiving countries over their competitors. 152 In 
addition, MFN trade reforms by large trading countries generally push up world market prices, 
thereby hurting net food importing countries, including many of the African LDCs.153 
 
                                                          
148
 Understanding the WTO: Peaks and escalation: what are they? Available at  
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/dev4_e.htm  (accessed on 02/04/2013). 
149
 It is noted that extremely high and often prohibitive peak tariffs of 100-900% continue to be applied by many 
developed countries for such major agricultural products as sugar, rice, cereals, dairy products, and meat as well as 
for food industry products and footwear. See Supper E. Is There Effectively a Level Playing Field for Developing 
Country Exports? Policy Issues in International Trade and Commodities Study Series, UNCTAD, 2001. 
150
 Understanding the WTO: Peaks’ and ‘escalation’: what are they? Available at  
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/dev4_e.htm  (accessed on 02/04/2013). 
151
 For a further discussion on preference erosion see Francois J, Hoekman B & Manchin M ‘Preference erosion and 
multilateral trade liberalisation’ (2005) available at  
http://www.ycsg.yale.edu/focus/gta/preference_erosion.pdf  (accessed on 02/04/2013). 
152
 Yu W ‘Preference erosion, the Doha round and African LDCs’ in Case study 9-10 of the program Food Policy for 
developing countries: The role of government in the global food system (2007) 2. 
153
  Yu W ‘Preference erosion, the Doha round and African LDCs’ in Case study 9-10 of the program Food Policy for 
developing countries: The role of government in the global food system (2007) 2. 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
2.5.3 Foreign direct investment  
 
The role of WTO membership and consequent trade liberalisation on the flow of FDI is at best 
unclear and controversial, as arguments have been advanced that a country can attract FDI 
whether or not it is a member of the WTO.154 Plenty of empirical evidence suggests that one of 
the main reasons for companies investing in a foreign country is to avoid that foreign country’s 
import barriers by producing within its borders. 155  Bypassing protectionist measures in the 
protectionist countries and being able to establish facilities within the protecting country were in 
fact noted in a WTO Secretariat report as one of the oldest reasons for FDI.156 From the above, 
one may conclude that higher import tariffs attract more FDI.157 However, economists explain 
that higher and lower barriers may both attract FDI but of different types. For instance, protected 
markets attract FDI which takes the form of stand-alone production units aimed at domestic 
markets, whereas lower trade barriers especially on intermediate goods are more favourable to 
vertical FDI attracted by the fundamental advantages of the host country, such as, lower labour 
costs, natural resources and generally favourable economic conditions.158 
 
There is an assertion that WTO membership will enhance the pace and scope of economic 
integration amongst its members and will, inter alia, help attract investment, which in turn is 
considered to be a potent tool in achieving economic growth. 159  Paradoxically, empirical 
research conducted on the subject tends to suggest that FDI has a negligible role, if any, to play 
in the economic growth of a country.160 Moreover, there is no evidence that a WTO investment 
agreement will necessarily lead to greater foreign investment for the poorest and most 
marginalised countries, let alone that they will be the ones to benefit the most. 161  This 
conclusion supports evidence already gathered in relation to investment flows arising from the 
GATS. Foreign investment in services accounts for half of the world total of FDI flows, and 
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developing countries have been assured in the past that making GATS commitments would 
increase the level of FDI they would receive in future. Yet this signalling has not brought 
additional FDI flows to host countries as they had been led to believe.162 It is thus argued that 
even without any GATS commitments;163 there is nothing to prevent a country inviting the kind 
of investment that will help it to achieve its development goals.164 The assertion that foreign 
companies will only invest in a country if they know that their interests are protected by 
commitments such as those imposed under the GATS, is again refuted by many, including 
United Nations Committee on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) who state that there is no 
empirical evidence to link any significant increase in FDI flows to developing countries with the 
conclusion of the GATS.165 
2.5.4 Dispute settlement enforcement 
 
With regard to the counter-argument on the DSM and its effective use by developing and small 
economies, evidence collected shows that developing countries have been increasing their 
participation in the world trading system and also the DSPs of the GATT/WTO.166 Compared to 
the 1974-1994 GATT period, there have been more disputes with developing country 
complainants and respondents initiated since the WTO’s inception in 1995.167 It is argued that 
some of this increase is merely a reflection of the growth of developing country membership; 
nevertheless, the increase in complainant activity is attributable to the idea that some trade 
barriers to dispute initiation have been reduced. On the other hand, the increase in respondent 
activity suggests that some developing countries have increased their market access 
                                                          
 
162
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Available at  
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commitments to a level where trading partners increasingly find such commitments valuable 
enough to spend resources to defend them.168 
 
There are two major factors that have, however, so far been identified as hindering effective and 
broader participation of DCs and LDCs in DSPs: first, the DSP is often too costly for a poor 
country to use;169  and secondly, the fact first even the final benefits of winning a case could 
amount to nothing. It is estimated that an amount of more than half a million dollars in legal fees 
may be required to litigate a WTO dispute which can last up to three years, and may need a 
significant time commitment by government officials who may already be severely under-
resourced.170 However, such efforts may be for nothing, for there is no assurance that a ruling 
will be affirmative or that the respondent will comply in a manner that leads to market access.171 
The WTO dispute settlement system envisages two types of remedies: compensation, which 
takes the form of reduction of trade restrictions in sectors where the winning party has a 
particular interest; or retaliation, that takes the form of withdrawal by the winning party of 
proportionate trade concessions in sectors of particular interest to the offending party. 172 
Retaliation is often considered most counterproductive to the interests of the winning party, as 
the cost of imposing these measures is simply too high and developing countries feel that given 
the small size of their markets, retaliation will never put sufficient pressure on larger, more 
developed members.173 In addition to the above there is the threat that DCs, despite legally 
winning a case, could face a bad economic outcome should the respondent decide to engage in 
retribution outside of the WTO system. 174  This could be done, for instance, through the 
reduction of bilateral assistance or of preferential access under the GSP or another preferential 
trade agreement.  These factors taken together contribute to unwillingness on the part of DCs to 
invoke dispute settlement against larger and richer trading partners and to engage in potential 
dispute settlement activity related to their market access interests, hence diminishing their 
effective gains. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter the WTO and its key principles as well as the accession process was explained. 
In addition, the challenges that are faced by LDCs while embarking on this process have been 
alerted to and emphasis was laid particularly on both the procedural and substantive aspects of 
the accession process. Procedural aspects were based on the constructive ambiguity of the 
article XII which is the legal provision dealing with the accession process while substantive 
aspects hinged on the extensive trade liberalisation demands requested by incumbent members 
from acceding applicants. Moreover, the aims of the WTO Guidelines for the accession of LDCs 
have been briefly introduced and discussed as well.  
 
Furthermore, the literature on WTO accession conveys various arguments and disputed 
evidence on LDCs WTO membership gains. This chapter endeavored to show the arguments in 
favour of and those against. At least five distinct rationales were identified as reasons why LDCs 
join the Organisation as well as the underlying WTO principles. A close examination was made 
of the following rationales: economic development, increasing and securing market access, FDI, 
effective domestic policies and institutions, and finally the cross-cutting accountability effected 
through binding commitments and securing enforcement mechanisms. However, while the 
above rationales indicate that WTO accession is in principle for the benefit of LDCs not all seem 
to share this optimism. Thus the dissenting views concerning the cost of accession were 
discussed with regards to economic development, securing market access, foreign direct 
investment as well as dispute settlement enforcement. 
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CHAPTER 3 
A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE MARKET ACCESS COMMITMENTS OF SIX 
LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE RECENTLY ACCEDED TO THE WORLD 
TRADE ORGANISATION 
3.1 Introduction 
 
As indicated in the preceding Chapter 2, section 2.4, least developed countries (LDCs), driven 
by the heralded pledge that membership to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) will, inter alia, 
facilitate economic growth and development, increase foreign investment, secure predictable 
and transparent market access, enhance domestic policy making and institutions, and increased 
access to dispute settlement, have launched a bid to join the WTO and have succeeded. Such 
is the case of the following recently acceded LDCs; Nepal and Cambodia in 2004, Tonga in 
2007, Samoa and Vanuatu in 2012 and Laos in 2013.175 The question that arises is whether 
reasons that motivated these countries to seek membership of the WTO may be sufficient to 
motivate South Sudan to accede to the WTO? 
To satisfactorily confirm the validity or otherwise of these assertions and provide an answer to 
the question posed above, an examination of each of the countries’ profiles before and after 
joining the WTO is required. However, due to a lack of tangible evidence and limited studies 
carried out on the direct effects of joining the WTO as regards each of these recently acceded 
countries, a proper assessment is not viable at present.176 Hence this research proposes the 
following different approach which has been formulated to answer both questions posed. The 
approach is to examine the market access commitments in both goods and services of the six 
recently acceded LDCs and compare and contrast them against those undertaken by incumbent 
WTO members as well as the LDCs accession guidelines. The main aim of this approach is to 
assess whether or not, LDCs are being ushered into the WTO on a level playing field and 
whether or not, it is as equal trading partners, based on the kind of market access commitments 
                                                          
175
 WTO accessions at www.wto.org (accessed on 25/04/2013). 
176
 This was identified by looking at empirical studies on impact of WTO accession on acceding countries as well as 
World Trade Policy reviews and reports on LDCs. Available literature pointed out the fact that at present, few 
accession LDCs have five or more years of post-accession data to begin identifying or quantifying the effect of WTO 
accession and therefore the available evidence here is very limited. 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
LDCs have made. This approach poses the queries, whether or not there is any strand of 
substantive fairness in the accession process.  Further on, what commitments should be 
expected of LDC applicant countries in the light of their development priorities and their 
economic capacity?  
The profound potential impacts of the WTO stem, it is argued, directly from the extensive 
commercial and rule commitments that a country undertakes on its accession. However, it has 
been noted that incumbent countries have always exerted pressure on acceding countries to 
make commitments that go way beyond their development capacities. Overall, it appears that 
recently acceded countries have made extensive liberalisation commitments that go beyond 
those made by existing members during the Uruguay Round. Furthermore, each newly 
acceding country is expected to make commitments that go beyond those of its predecessor. 
The WTO’s General Council therefore agreed on Guidelines to facilitate and ease the process 
of the accession of LDCs to the WTO. Have the accession guidelines yielded the very 
objectives for which they were created? Have LDCs received the special recommendations as 
promised?  
 
In answering these questions, the chapter will focus on the most significant of the WTO 
commitments specifically in the areas of market access undertaken by these six LDCs. Further 
on, it will examine the weaknesses and strengths of the accession guidelines in light of the 
experience of each of these countries, and analyse these commitments in terms of their 
compatibility with general development objectives that are supposed to underpin the accession 
of LDCs to the WTO. 
 
To achieve the above, the chapter proceeds as follows. It briefly gives a general introduction as 
to the reasons why each of these six countries joined the WTO and at the nature and scope of 
each of the six countries’ market access commitments in the areas of goods and services. 
Thereafter follows a comparative assessment of the extent of the commitments a) amongst 
themselves and b) amongst the original WTO members. The research then briefly discusses 
whether the accession guidelines have achieved their intended objectives. Through this same 
lens there is a further critical analysis of the acceding LDCs’ commitments with reference to the 
requirements of the new WTO accession guidelines, and their implications for these countries. 
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3.2 Nature and scope of the six LDCs’ WTO commitments as regards market access 
 
3.2.1 Nepal 
 
In its quest to move along with global economic development, the Nepalese government 
realised that it could not remain aloof from the waves of globalisation. Consequently, it applied 
for membership of the GATT in May 1989. In that year, Nepal’s bilateral trade and transit 
agreements with India, a major trading partner, were terminated and remained stalemated thus 
creating uncertainty for Nepal’s foreign trade. It was against this backdrop that Nepal realised 
the essence of GATT membership in ensuring predictable and stable trade relations with its 
partners, including protection under GATT Article V on transit rights.177 Nepal later acceded to 
the WTO in 2004 as the 147th member of the multilateral trade body and as the first LDC to 
have joined the institution through the process of accession.178 
Nepal had a dire need to integrate into the global trading system and to gain the advantages of 
global trade, and therefore commenced the accession process for membership.179 For a poor, 
landlocked and donor dependent country such as Nepal, membership of the WTO was 
necessary as it would ensure an alternative means of protection as part of the global 
mainstream and less vulnerability.180 Apart from achieving broad based growth, the government 
of Nepal envisaged using WTO membership for disciplining its trading partners, achieving 
enhanced market access, benefiting from the special and differential treatment (S&DT) within 
the WTO system for LDCs, and securing transit rights to the sea.181 Nepal’s important market 
access commitments in goods and services under the WTO are discussed below. 
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3.2.1.1 Bound tariffs 
 
With reference to agricultural goods, Nepal bound its agricultural tariffs at an average of 42 
percent.182 Nepal bound 99.3 percent of its tariff lines for its non-agricultural products,183 with the 
exception of a few tariff lines, such as, petroleum products, and cement, arms and ammunition, 
and it bound its industrial tariff at an average of 23.7 percent.184 In terms of tariff peaks, Nepal’s 
maximum duty is at 200 percent.185 
3.2.1.2 Services 
 
In the area of services, Nepal opened up all 11 services sectors and 70 subsector out of the 160 
WTO subsectors. 186  The 11 service sectors comprised: business services; communication 
services; construction and related engineering services; distribution services; educational 
services; environment services; financial services; health and related social services; tourism 
and travel-related services; recreational, cultural and sporting services: and transport 
services.187 Nepal had initially been asked to open all services sectors in which it had made a 
commitment, for 100 percent equity participation by foreigners within a period of five years but 
instead agreed to 80 percent foreign equity participation.188 
3.2.2 Cambodia 
 
The Royal Government of the Kingdom of Cambodia applied for membership of the WTO in 
1994.189 Following the Doha Declaration of November 2001 that eased membership conditions 
for LDCs, Cambodia’s membership was finally approved in September 2003 at the Cancun 
Ministerial Conference.190 However, its membership did not become effective until a year later 
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because an internal political deadlock in Cambodia after the July 2003 elections delayed 
ratification.191 
 
Cambodia acknowledged the role of international trade in alleviating poverty and accelerating 
economic growth and development, and initiated ambitious preliminaries to becoming a member 
of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the WTO.192 It filed an official 
WTO application on 8 December 1994.193 Accession to the WTO was seen as a necessary 
means to achieve economic growth.194 In the words of the Cambodian chief negotiator: 
‘In a time of harsh and fierce global competition, the survival of our country depends on 
our ability to capture the right opportunities and at the right time. We believe the entry to 
the WTO is such a case’.195 
 
As an acceding member, Cambodia was obliged to make the market access commitments 
discussed below.196 
3.1.2.1 Bound tariffs 
 
Cambodia agreed to bind 100 percent of its tariff lines, which effectively set ceilings on the tariff 
rates of all imported products.197 This prevents it from increasing tariff rates on imported goods 
above the tariff rate to which it has committed.198 
 
In particular, the overall average bound duty rate that Cambodia agreed to, was 19.1 percent.199 
For agricultural products, Cambodia agreed to a simple average bound rate of 28.1 percent.200 
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Peak bound rates for the most sensitive agricultural products were 60 percent and the lowest 
bound rate was 5 percent.201 
 
For industrial products, the average bound rate was 17.7 percent and peak bound rates were 50 
percent, and the lowest rate was 0 percent.202 In addition to setting bound tariffs, Cambodia also 
agreed that it would not introduce, re-introduce, or apply quantitative restrictions or other 
nontariff barriers on imports, such as licensing, quotas, prohibitions, bans, and other restrictions 
having equivalent effects that could not be justified under the provisions of the WTO 
agreements.203 
3.2.2.2 Services 
 
Cambodia undertook market access commitments in at least one subsector under each of 11 
different services headings of the WTO classification. These are: business services; 
communications services; construction and related engineering services; distribution services; 
education services; environmental services; financial services; health related services; tourism 
and travel services; recreational services; and transport services.204 It scheduled commitments 
in a total of 94 subsectors.205 
3.2.3 Tonga 
 
The kingdom of Tonga applied for WTO membership in 1995 and it became the 151st member 
in July 2007.206  Economic factors have been identified as the main motivation for Tonga’s 
application to join the WTO. The kingdom’s economy is characterised by a heavy economic 
concentration in migration, remittances, and dependence on foreign aid donors. Its most 
significant and strategic bilateral partners and aid donors include Australia, New Zealand, Japan 
and China.207 It is submitted that due to severe dependence on the willingness of multilateral 
organisations and these bilateral partners to offer it foreign aid, Tonga’s policies and 
governmental actions are largely influenced by provisions found in the respective aid contracts 
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and conditions attached to the aid packages.208 Hence, following their own rational interests and 
having much to gain from Tonga, the aid donors as WTO members encouraged Tonga to join 
the Organisation and might have played a crucial role in its accession. 209  Moreover, it is 
submitted that the only way that this small country could elevate itself onto a level playing field 
with powerful trading nations having equal rights and opportunities in a system based on rules 
instead of power and gaining much needed market access for its exports was by it acceding to 
the WTO.210 
3.2.3.1 Bound tariffs 
 
Tonga’s accession deal required it to bind all tariffs, both agricultural and industrial, at either 15 
percent or 20 percent.211 Tonga was allowed up to a maximum bound rate of 17.6 percent tariff 
on all products. It bound agricultural products at an average bound rate of 19.2 percent and 
non-agricultural products at a binding average rate of 17.3 percent.212 It agreed to a binding 
coverage of 100 percent on all its products.213 Tonga had wanted to secure a bound tariff level 
of 35 percent or higher but pressure from its Working Party resulted in the low tariff bindings of 
15 to 20 percent across all products. This reflects the general trend of acceding countries 
binding their tariffs at lower and lower levels. 
3.2.3.2 Services 
 
On services, Tonga also made fairly extensive commitments, including in sectors, such as, 
health, education, financial, transport, and telecoms.214 It undertook commitments in nine out of 
the 11 service categories and undertook commitments in 36 subsectors out of a total of 53 
subsectors.215 
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3.2.4 Samoa 
 
For Samoa, accession to WTO membership would provide major benefits in terms of protection 
from discriminatory treatment, protection of its intellectual property rights, transparency and 
consistency in government policies, provision of technical assistance, and long-term economic 
welfare gains including FDI inflows. 216 Of huge importance was the protection of Samoa’s 
legitimate rights. Samoa’s exports were often subject to unfair trade practices relating to the 
arbitrary application of quarantine measures, arbitrary imposition of import fees and charges, 
and the use of the Samoan trade mark and geographical indication by other countries.217 
3.2.4.1 Bound Tariffs 
In its market access for goods, Samoa agreed to bind 100 percent of its tariffs and to apply a 
simple average final bound rate of 21.1 percent for all its goods.218 Samoa agreed to bind at 0 
percent all other duties and charges in its schedule of concessions and commitments. 219 
Agricultural products were bound at an average rate of 19.6 percent and at 22.3 percent for 
non-agricultural products with a binding coverage of 100 percent on all products.220 
3.2.4.2 Services 
With regard to market access for services, Samoa has made specific commitments on 10 out of 
11 broad range of services sectors, including, professional, computer and other business 
services, communication services, construction, and private educational, environmental, 
financial  and tourism services, and in a total of  81 subsectors.221 
3.2.5 Vanuatu 
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The explicit impetus for Vanuatu’s accession to the WTO was drawn from its structural 
adjustment package known as the Comprehensive Reform Programme (CPR).222 The goals of 
this set of reforms were to enhance the role of the private sector, improve governance, increase 
economic growth, and further liberalise the economy. But as part of this last process the 
programme was directed at reducing trade barriers within the context of WTO membership.223 It 
has been submitted that an additional reason for accession by Vanuatu was the fact that all of 
its neighbours and principal trading partners (Fiji, the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, 
Australia and New Zealand) were WTO members.224 As a result therefore, Vanuatu believed 
that its trade relations would be better enhanced within the WTO framework. 
 
Being among the first LDCs to apply to the WTO immediately after its formation, it was expected 
to be the first to accede.225 However, the accession negotiations proved to be difficult for it, and 
the rights that the LDC WTO members are entitled to were largely denied to Vanuatu.226 The 
country was subjected to strong pressure to make sweeping liberalisation commitments, and in 
particular it had disagreements with the United States over a range of issues, including, the 
broad parameters of the goods offer, the extent of services commitments, and several crucial 
protocol issues pertaining to the transition periods of LDCs. 227  By the end of the 1990s 
accession negotiations were stalled. Vanuatu and the United States resumed negotiations in 
2001 but even then its accession process was again put on hold until 2011.Vanuatu officially 
joined the WTO in 2012 and made the following market access commitments.228 
3.2.5.1 Bound tariffs  
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Vanuatu agreed to apply an average final bound rate of 39.7 percent for all its products.229 Its 
final offer for average bound tariff rates was 43.6 percent on agricultural goods.230 This is a little 
higher than Nepal’s final bound rates and much higher than Cambodia’s but still low for an LDC. 
It agreed to a simple average bound rate of 39.1 percent for industrial products.231 All Vanuatu's 
tariffs are bound and 85 percent of tariff lines are either at 35 percent or 40 percent.232 
3.2.5.2 Services 
 
On trade in services, Vanuatu has made specific commitments on 10 services sectors and on 
72 subsectors, such as, accounting, architectural services, engineering, telecommunications, 
audio visual, hospital and social services, tourism and travel, and air transport.233 
3.2.6 Laos 
 
To the key question as to why Laos applied for WTO membership, the government provided a 
number of different answers. Laos’ motivation was the need to be part of the global community 
and share the benefits of WTO membership instead of being left out as the only country of the 
ASEAN that was not a WTO member.234 
Its main goal was not market access as such but the need to push forward reforms and bring 
laws and regulations into compliance with international standards in order to facilitate business 
development and trade which would in turn have a positive impact on Laos’ exports.235  The 
advantage of accessing the WTO’s DSP and the technical and financial assistance associated 
with the accession process were regarded as an opportunity for Laos to learn from the 
international community in terms of capacity building.236 
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3.2.6.1 Bound tariffs 
Laos agreed to bind its tariffs at an average of 18.8 percent for all goods, with an average 
bound rate of 19.3 percent for agricultural goods, and an average bound rate of 18.7 percent for 
all other non-agricultural products.237 
3.2.6.2 Services 
 
In services, Laos made market access commitments in 10 sectors, covering 79 subsectors. It 
made market commitments in the area of services, specifically in business services, courier and 
telecoms services, construction, distribution, private education, environmental services, 
insurance, banking and other finances, private hospital services, tourism, and air transport.238 
3.3 Comparative assessment amongst the recently acceded LDCs and comparison with 
current member states 
 
An examination of the market access commitments made and agreed to by the six countries 
indicates the extent to which the decision by the WTO General Council on the Guidelines has 
been respected. And as will be shown below, the overall assessment indicates that this is not 
fully the case. 
3.3.1 The recently acceded LDCs 
3.3.1.1 Bound tariffs 
 
The simple average agricultural bound tariff rates for the six countries were 43.6 percent for 
Vanuatu, 41.5 percent for Nepal, 28.1 percent for Cambodia, 25.8 percent for Samoa, and 
19.3percent for Laos, 19.2 percent for Tonga respectively. The corresponding figures for 
industrial tariff rates were 39.1 percent for Vanuatu, 23.7 percent for Nepal, 20.4 percent for 
Samoa, 18.7 percent for Laos, 17.7 percent for Cambodia, and 17.3 percent for Tonga. 
 
While the WTO Agreement on Agriculture requires all members to bind all agricultural tariff 
lines,239 the level of binding coverage in industrial goods varies among the recently acceded 
LDCs. Except for Nepal which has bound 99.3 percent of its NAMA tariff lines, all the other five 
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agreed to a 100 percent binding coverage each. 240  Tariff peaks and minimal rates for 
agricultural products were 75 percent and 0 percent for Vanuatu, 60 per cent and 5 percent for 
Cambodia, and 200 percent and 10 percent for Nepal.241 The commitments of the 30 founding 
LDC members are at an average of 79 percent and tariff peaks of 130 percent.242 For industrial 
products the corresponding rates were 75 percent and 0 percent for Vanuatu, 50 per cent and 0 
per cent for Cambodia, and 130 percent and 0 percent for Nepal.243 
This observation goes on to indicate that recent joiners of the WTO are always making 
excessive commitments. For both agricultural and non-agricultural goods the average tariff 
binding that acceding countries were allowed is falling over time and is now at levels well below 
those agreed by WTO members.  
3.3.1.2 Services 
 
Both Nepal and Cambodia made specific commitments in all the 11 sectors of the WTO 
services sectors, whereas Samoa, Laos and Vanuatu made 10 sector specific commitments 
and Tonga made the same commitments in only 9 sectors. Although the total number of 
subsectors committed varied across all these countries, it is noted that Cambodia, Nepal, 
Samoa, Vanuatu and Laos made substantially greater liberalisation commitments. Cambodia, 
Nepal, and Samoa undertook commitments in 94, 99 and 81 subsectors, respectively, 244 
whereas Laos, Vanuatu and Tonga undertook them in 79, 72 and 36 subsectors, respectively. 
With regard to horizontal limitations and commitments, there is no noteworthy difference among 
these six countries. The six countries made substantial liberalisation offers in the areas of 
financial, professional, distribution, educational and environmental services and kept Mode 4 
unbound for all the services scheduled. Mode 1 (cross-border supply) and Mode 2 (consumption 
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abroad) usually had no restrictions. For Mode 3 (commercial presence) restrictions on equity 
participation were occasionally scheduled.245 
Other limitations scheduled included the obligation by the foreign investors to train and promote 
local staff. This was scheduled by both Samoa and Tonga.246 All except Tonga scheduled the 
right to provide subsidies, including that for research and development, and limited it only to 
domestic service providers, while those available to natural persons were to be given only to its 
citizens. Moreover Foreign Service suppliers and foreign nationals in all the six countries cannot 
own, but may only lease, land. As a matter of fact, the Civil Code of Nepal prohibits anyone from 
selling, mortgaging, gifting, endowing or disposing any real property to a foreign individual.247 
Nepal also scheduled limitations on the approval requirements for commercial presence and 
foreign exchange restrictions and fees.248 As additional commitments, Nepal scheduled its offer 
to make decisions on approval of commercial presence within 30 days and to guarantee 
entitlement for repatriation.249 
Notably, a typical collective request from the incumbent members of the WTO was to make 
demands from the acceding LDCs, targeting sectors, such as, finance, telecommunications, 
construction, energy, educational, environment services, computer and related services, 
maritime transport and architectural and engineering services. All of these are of vital 
importance to LDCs.250 All requests involved far-reaching demands, especially for Modes 1, 2 
and 3. With regard to Mode 3, the LDCs were typically requested to permit maximum freedom to 
foreign firms and operators to engage in trade and investment while affording them national 
treatment.  
These fairly extensive commitments raise questions about the kind of implications that would 
result for access by the poor to affordable services should foreign suppliers decide to compete 
in the market. It is claimed that the entry of foreign suppliers, in the absence of appropriate 
regulations and institutions which is a characteristic of most LDCs, may result in cherry-picking, 
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crowding out of local suppliers, and an increase in the cost of services that the government and 
local suppliers initially provided.251  As is submitted by Ellis and Willem te Verde, the major 
challenge that this ultimately presents to the LDCs is how to protect their services sectors and 
prevent entry into their services markets by developed countries.252 
3.3.2 Comparison with current WTO member states 
 
While the comparison of the six countries with one another highlights the fact that the different 
countries reached agreement about accession on relatively different terms, a further comparison 
of the commitments of these six countries with those of current WTO members reveals that the 
six LDCs made commitments that significantly exceed commitments made by current WTO 
members. This is discussed below. 
3.3.2.1 Bound tariffs 
 
The level of commitments undertaken by the30 original LDC members to the LDCs that joined 
the WTO more recently, both for agricultural and non-agricultural market access products, on 
average, are 47.2  and  21.4 percentage points lower, respectively.253 The commitments of 
Nepal, Cambodia, Vanuatu, Laos, Samoa and Tonga to both agricultural and non-agricultural 
goods are much lower than those of other LDC members of the WTO. Vanuatu has thehighest 
bound average rate on all products for the above- mentioned LDCs with an average bound tariff 
rate of 39.7 percent. This figure is still considered very low for a LDC compared to the tariff level 
of the existing WTO Members, including incumbent LDC members. The average bound tariff 
rates for other LDC members of the WTO, such as, Bangladesh, Tanzania and Zambia are 
169.3 percent, 120 percent and 106.5 percent respectively. They all have average bound tariff 
rates of more than 100 percent.254 Both India and Cameroon, other DC members, also have 
higher average tariff rates of 48.7 percent and 97.5 percent respectively. 255 The recently 
acceded countries have had to liberalise more and agree to open their markets more than the 
earlier WTO joiners. 
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Similarly, while the recently acceded LDCs have agreed to bind 100 percent of their tariff lines, 
other countries that are already members of the WTO have bound a much smaller share 
thereof. Only nine incumbent LDCs have a 100 percent binding coverage, while over half of the 
LDCs have bound less than 50 percent of their tariff lines. 256  For example, Tanzania, 
Mozambique and Bangladesh, all original GATT contracting members and LDCs, have a 
binding coverage of 13.4 percent, 13.6 percent and 15.5 percent, respectively.257 Furthermore, 
when compared to Cameroon and India, both DCs which have a binding coverage of 13.3 
percent and 73.8 percent, respectively, and to Australia, a developed WTO member, which has 
a binding coverage of 99.7 percent,258 these recently acceded LDCs have undoubtedly made 
excessive commitments. 
 
While Cambodia’s bound rates are as high as 60 percent for sensitive agricultural products and 
Nepal’s bound rates are as high as 200 percent for selected agricultural goods, LDC members 
of the WTO, such as Myanmar, have bound rates on agricultural goods as high as 550 
percent.259 Other DC members of the WTO, like Egypt have bound tariff rates on agricultural 
goods above 1,000 percent and developed country members of the WTO such as the United 
States, have bound tariff rates on agricultural goods as high as 350 percent.260 Moreover, while 
Cambodia and Nepal have bound tariff rates on non-agricultural goods at a maximum level of 
50 percent and 130 percent, respectively, LDC members of the WTO have bound their tariffs in 
the same category as high as 550 percent for Myanmar and 300 percent for the Maldives, while 
Romania, a DC member of the WTO, has bound them as high as 220 percent.261 Developed 
country members of the WTO having significantly well-developed industrial sectors, such as 
Australia, have bound their tariff rates at a maximum level of 48 percent.262 
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A further comparison of the commitments made by the six LDCs, on the one hand, with 
commitments made by the Quad countries,263 on the other hand, shows these six LDCs were 
expected to make some commitments in the accession process that even exceed the 
commitments that have been made by some of the most advanced countries who are the 
largest importers of products from LDCs.264 Both the European Union and the United States 
have a binding coverage of 100 percent, and Canada and Japan have a binding coverage of 
over 99.7 percent.265 
 
The Quad countries have reserved the right to apply high tariffs to some of their products. As a 
matter of fact, in the agricultural goods sector, all the Quad countries have peaks in tariff 
bindings that exceed those of Cambodia, while both Canada and the United States also have 
peaks in tariff bindings that exceed those of Nepal. The tariff bindings in this sector are as high 
as 350 percent for the United States, followed by 238.4 percent for Canada, 74.9 percent for the 
European Union, and 61.9 percent for Japan.266 In the non-agricultural goods sector, the peaks 
in tariff bindings of all Quad countries are lower than those of Cambodia and Nepal with the 
United States tariff bindings in this sector as high as 48 per cent, followed by 30 percent for 
Japan, 26 percent for the European Union and 20 percent for Canada.267 
3.3.2.2 Services 
 
The story is similar concerning service commitments. Looking at the number of services 
subsectors committed to by incumbent WTO members, the recently acceded LDCs have made 
substantially more extensive commitments than the former, regardless of their development 
status.  
 
Research points out that at the most aggregate level, WTO members have on average taken 
out some kind of commitment in 6 sectors out of a maximum of 11.268 The comparable figures 
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for the six most recently acceded LDCs are 10, as indicated above. At a more detailed or 
disaggregated level, acceding countries have commitments in 103 sectors on average as 
against 42 for existing members. The recently acceded LDCs, (Nepal, Cambodia, Samoa, 
Tonga, Laos and Vanuatu) have all committed to liberalise almost all their sectors and over 70 
subsectors except for Tonga that has liberalised 36 subsectors out of 53 which is still 
considered to be excessive. By comparison, Bangladesh also a LDC member of the WTO, has 
only liberalised two sectors and 11 subsectors, the Solomon Islands 4 sectors and 6 subsectors 
and Fiji only 1 subsector.269 The DCs in the WTO, such as, India and Pakistan, have only 
committed to liberalise six sectors and 37 subsectors and five sectors and 47 subsectors, 
respectively.270 
 
In summary, the above clearly confirms that the recently acceded LDCs have committed to 
much more than they would have had to if they were already WTO members, and to more than 
the average of existing WTO members. Although authors, such as, Evenett and Braga, rightly 
point out that the number of services sectors committed to by an acceding state is a crude 
measure of the price of accession, it is argued that it nevertheless shows that founding 
members and accession countries at the same development status are treated differently.271 
3.4 The WTO’s Guidelines for the accession of LDCs, and its weaknesses 
 
The decision of the General Council dated 10 December 2002 on streamlining accession of 
LDCs states: 
 
‘WTO Members shall exercise restraint in seeking concessions and commitments on 
trade in goods and services from acceding LDCs, taking into account the levels of 
concessions and commitments undertaken by existing WTO LDCs' Members.” and 
“Acceding LDCs shall offer access through reasonable concessions and commitments 
on trade in goods and services commensurate with their individual development, 
financial and trade needs, in line with Article XXXVI.8 of GATT 1994,  Article 15 of the 
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Agreement on Agriculture, and Articles IV and XIX of the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services’.272 
 
However, whilst the lofty objectives enshrined in these guidelines are indeed encouraging, the 
facts on the ground speak otherwise. Drawing from the above comparisons and evidence of the 
six recent WTO acceded LDCs’ market access commitments in both goods and services, it can 
be argued that they made more stringent commitments than many of the developing countries 
and even more stringent commitments than some of the developed countries, including the 
Quad countries, which are the LDCs’ most important export markets.273 This poses the question, 
why is it that the LDCs that newly acceded to the WTO are not allowed to bind at the same 
levels as the original LDC members of the WTO or make commitments that are commensurate 
with their own levels of economic and financial capacities? This research submits that there is 
no significant difference between the LDCs who joined then and those who joined last in terms 
of their economic and development capacities. They are all still categorised as LDCs 
characterised by low per capita income, dependent on a small number of export goods, mostly 
raw materials, and are all crippled by issues of food insecurity. 274  Looking at the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) world reports, Nepal, Tonga, Vanuatu, Laos, Samoa and Cambodia 
are all largely dependent on subsistence agriculture for their economic growth and are 
undergoing the same amount of economic and development paralysis. 275 And these 
characteristics are still the same even for the original LDCs in the WTO. In a nutshell, there is 
no reason why incumbent LDC members of the WTO should have more favourable market 
access terms than the applicant LDC members. 
 
Cambodia’s and Nepal’s accession in 2004 had particular significance because they 
represented the first two LDCs to accede to the WTO since its creation in 1995.276 It was 
expected that their terms of accession would reflect the General Council’s decision on the 
accession of LDCs. However this was not the case. This even led the then Minister of 
Commerce of Cambodia to comment: 
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‘This is a package of concessions and commitments that goes far beyond what is 
commensurate with the level of development of an LDC like Cambodia’.277 
 
Similarly, Vanuatu, Samoa, Laos and Tonga’s accession commitments were not at all any 
different, but if closely compared to those of Cambodia and Nepal, it is sad to note that they 
were even much more stringent.278 This confirms that acceding members are making more 
extensive commitments than their predecessors. 
The findings of the above comparisons can therefore be summarised in one short sentence: the 
WTO members have failed to live up to the market access promises they made to the LDCs in 
2002.They have failed to exercise restraint in seeking market access commitments and 
concessions that go beyond those undertaken by the existing WTO LDC members and beyond 
those that are commensurate with their individual development, financial and trade needs.279 
 
Furthermore, in answering the question posed as to whether LDCs are being ushered into the 
WTO on a levelled playing field and as equal partners, the answer is not in the affirmative. It is 
evident that the concept of fairness in the accession process of the WTO is violated by the lack 
of coherence and consistency in the kind of concessions requested from acceding LDCs.  
3.5 Critical analysis of the 2012 WTO Guidelines for the accession of LDCs 
 
At the Eighth WTO Ministerial Conference in December 2011, trade ministers decided to further 
strengthen, streamline and operationalise the 2002 LDC accession Guidelines with the inclusion 
of benchmarks, particularly in the area of goods and services, which take into account the level 
of commitments undertaken by existing LDC members.280 The discussion below only looks at 
the criticisms advanced regarding the benchmarks on goods and services, as the discussion of 
the six recently acceded LDCs mainly focused on these two aspects. 
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3.5.1 Goods benchmarks 
 
In terms of the benchmark on goods, acceding LDCs are required to bind all agricultural tariff 
lines at an overall average rate of50 percent,281 while the average level of the original 30 LDCs 
is 78 percent and that of the recently acceded LDCs is at 32 percent.282 With regard to non-
agricultural products, the accession decision provides for the following two options. First, 
acceding LDCs shall bind 95 percent of their non-agricultural market access lines at an overall 
average rate of 35 percent whilst having the flexibility to retain 5 percent of their industrial tariff 
lines unbound although the specific lines would need to be negotiated.283 Secondly, they may 
also undertake more comprehensive binding coverage and be afforded proportionately higher 
overall average rates than provided for when they undertake lesser comprehensive binding.284 
In such a case, the acceding LDCs shall be entitled to transition periods of up to 10 years for up 
to 10 percent of their tariff lines.285 
 
In favour of these Guidelines, it is argued that by exempting 5 percent of tariffs from binding, 
newly acceding LDCs will be able to protect their vital economic interests due to the fact that a 
significant share of all acceding LDCs’ trade will be covered by this exempted tariff 
percentage.286 The proposals for average bindings further require LDCs to bind at 50 percent for 
agricultural goods and at 35 percent for non-agricultural goods, and they can be applauded for 
this because these rates are much higher than the 32 percent and 23 percent, respectively, for 
the same goods  required of recently acceded LDCs.287 However, they are still not at the levels  
required of the original WTO LDC members whose agricultural tariff lines are bound at an 
overall average rate of 78 percent, and 44.4 percent for NAMA.288 
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This benchmark, however, is not without its criticisms. Tariffs play a vital role in countries’ 
economies, especially those of LDCs.289 The income derived from tariffs provides governments 
with a source of tax revenue,290  and they are also a policy tool used to protect domestic 
industries by changing the conditions under which goods compete in such a way that 
competitive imports are placed at a commercial disadvantage.291 In summary, the following have 
been identified as the negative impacts of tariff reduction:(a) they may lead to a surge in 
imports, thereby forcing domestic competitors out of business and resulting in increased 
unemployment in developing countries;(b) tariff cuts can result in a reduction of government 
revenue, leaving the government with fewer resources for fighting poverty and for other social 
programmes; and finally, (c) tariff reductions may undermine industrialization policies in 
developing countries by exposing industries to competition before they are strong enough to 
compete in the world.292 
 
With regard to the new Guidelines, it is therefore submitted that an increase in the binding 
coverage to about 95 percent or over100 percent effectively closes the door to the use of tariffs 
as a trade policy tool to leverage industrial development, further squeezing the policy space.293 
Capping industrial tariff lines below 35 percent as has been done by the above recently acceded 
LDCs, (Cambodia, Nepal, Laos, Samoa, and Tonga) and as will be required for those wishing to 
accede, will mean a substantial loss of government revenue which perhaps can only be 
replaced by conditionality bound International Monetary Fund (IMF),and World Bank loans.294 
Binding tariffs at such lower rates close to these acceding LDCs’ applied rates may reduce 
policy options for acceding countries in the future as well as sharply curtail their ability to use 
infant industry protection to industrialise and protect domestic jobs the way that developed 
countries did.295 With the sole exception of Hong Kong China, no other country has been able to 
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industrialise without going through the infant industry protection phase.296 Tariffs appear to be 
the only potent tool available to LDCs in their bid to protect their nascent industries and avoid 
massive unemployment that has accompanied unbridled liberalisation.297 
 
It is further argued that the ability to raise or lower applied tariffs is essential to the quest for the 
diversification of the economies of LDCs.298 The necessity for LDCs to diversify away from 
reliance on a few primary products in the wake of massive declines in the terms of trade that 
have characterised their participation in world trade, is hardly controversial. 299  Notably, 
industrialisation development remains a viable strategy to actualise the dream of diversification 
into more dynamic sectors, but the ability to build a durable industrial base in these countries 
may depend on their ability to shield infant industries from unsustainable import competition by 
raising tariffs in response to external factors, and even to meet revenue needs.300 Preserving 
this policy space is therefore important for social and economic development. 
 
According to the IMF, a significant number of LDCs rely on tariff revenue for more than 76 
percent of their government revenue. This is in contrast to countries in the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) where tariff revenues represent on average 
1 percent or less of government revenue.301 For instance, a country like Guinea derives about 
76 percent of its tax revenues from tariffs, Uganda 49.8 percent, Lesotho 47.7 percent’ and 
Gambia 42.8percent.302 According to the IMF economists, if LDCs cut their tariffs to such levels, 
low income countries are at best likely to recover 30 percent or less of this lost tariff revenue 
from other taxation sources.303 They note that a value added tax is not proven to make up for 
the lost revenue from lowered tariffs. It is therefore submitted that the loss of government 
revenue that will follow the tariff reduction will constrain the ability of governments to maintain or 
increase social spending that benefits the poor. 
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3.5.2 Services benchmarks 
 
It is submitted that the agreed text does not contain benchmarks, but rather a repetition of 
principles which already exist and are enshrined but have largely not been applied.304 According 
to the Guidelines, incumbent WTO members agreed to take into account the serious difficulties 
of acceding LDCs in undertaking commitments, bearing in mind their special economic situation 
and their individual development, financial and trade needs.305 Acceding members are afforded 
the flexibility to select the sectors in which they wish to undertake commitments, fully or partially, 
and the conditions attached thereto. 306  Furthermore, the incumbent WTO members are to 
exercise restraint in seeking commitments in trade and services from acceding members.307 
They will not require the acceding LDCs to undertake commitments in services sectors and 
subsectors that exceed those undertaken by the current WTO members or in sectors and 
subsectors that do not correspond to their individual development and trade needs.308 
 
However, unlike the goods benchmarks, these new Guidelines have fallen short of establishing 
measurable and clearly enforceable benchmarks.309 As a matter of fact, it is argued that this 
benchmark that states that there should be no commitments in services sectors and subsectors 
that exceed what has been committed to by existing WTO LDC members, could actually be 
dangerous for the development interests of LDCs and could negatively reflect on their 
negotiating processes.310 This is because this Guideline does not clearly and precisely define 
the extent to which LDCs should liberalise. This is likely to have the effect of opening the 
floodgates for an extensive interpretation, such as, giving the WTO members the discretion to 
request the maximum commitment of each LDC in the various sectors and subsectors. 
Alternatively, this decision may give full freedom to incumbent WTO members to impose more 
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stringent commitments on newcomers which go way beyond what other countries have done.311 
It is thus feared that the proposed text would do little to prevent WTO members from seeking 
disproportionate services commitments from acceding LDCs. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The 2002 accession Guidelines for LDCs certainly did not contain much of what the LDCs 
wished for. It merely reflected their wishes but not much was put into practice. The incumbent 
WTO members were requested in the Guidelines to exercise restraint when seeking 
concessions and commitments from acceding LDCs. As a result of the failure to act as per the 
Guidelines, at the Eighth Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong, the 2012 accession Guidelines 
were adopted to further strengthen, streamline and operationalise the failed 2002 accession 
Guidelines. Certain provisions have been trumpeted as positives in the new Guidelines, but 
once subjected to closer scrutiny are bound to be revealed as nothing more than hollow 
victories. As has been shown above using the case studies of the six LDCs, recently acceded 
LDCs have indeed undertaken commitments that certainly go well above and beyond the levels 
of concessions and commitments undertaken by the existing 30 WTO LDC members and other 
WTO members. 
The fact that, except for the option of leaving 5 percent of tariff lines unbound, binding the 
remaining 95 percent implies that there is no single kind of goods in respect of which these 
countries can raise tariff rates without facing an upper limit. The fact that many tariff rates are 
bound at relatively low levels implies that there are only very few goods in respect of which 
these countries can raise tariff rates to high levels. The combination of these factors effectively 
limits the ability of these countries to use tariffs in the future as an instrument to promote 
economic development. 
 
The experience of these six LDCs shows that, rather than being integrated into the multilateral 
trading system on terms that are more favourable, weaker countries are integrated into that 
system on terms that are at best equal to those of other developing countries and at worst less 
favourable than those of more advanced member states. It cannot be expected that relatively 
underdeveloped countries will become the equals of the more advanced members of the 
multilateral trading system by encouraging them to make the same or even higher 
commitments. 
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The outcomes of the market access commitments in goods and services of LDCs currently in 
the process of accession have not yet been finalised, but drawing from the above, the standards 
have already been set by the incumbent WTO members. Their fate will undoubtedly not be 
anything different to that of the preceding recently acceded LDCs. The question then arises: 
what are the potential implications of binding tariffs at such lower levels, extensive services 
liberalisation, and loss of policy space would be on a LDC like South Sudan. Should South 
Sudan accede to the WTO? This is discussed further in chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH SUDAN OF THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANISATION’S MARKET ACCESS COMMITMENTS 
4.1 Introduction 
Any country wishing to accede to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is required to purchase 
its membership ticket by making binding commitments in both the areas of goods and services. 
However, as was noted in the previous chapter 3, a closer examination of the nature of the 
bound commitments and services sectors committed by the least developed countries (LDCs) 
that have recently acceded to the WTO revealed that these countries undertook excessive 
market access commitments in comparison to the original WTO members. What this 
undoubtedly means is that any applicant country envisaging accession will have to make such 
comprehensive commitments or more. With this in mind, it is inevitable that the following 
question will arise: to what extent will compliance with the WTO’s market access commitments 
affect acceding LDCs and in particular South Sudan? 
It is submitted that incumbent WTO members seeking ambitious tariff reductions and requiring 
acceding LDCs to bind at such low levels will result in several consequences, including but not 
limited to the following. First, it is a constraint on LDCs’ policy space in general. Secondly, it will 
curtail the LDCs ability to use industry protection to industrialise. Thirdly, the services 
commitments will make it difficult for LDCs to protect domestic jobs and services sectors from 
foreign domination. Fourthly, LDCs will lose a significant amount of government revenue.312 
Fifthly, it will cause food insecurity in LDCs. Sixthly it will cause a failure of LDCs to rectify 
existent trade deficits. Lastly, tariff reduction will negatively influence the common external tariffs 
of customs unions. The first four implications have been considered important and have 
undoubtedly also been envisaged for South Sudan and are discussed below. 
This chapter goes into a deeper assessment of how the WTO market access commitments 
impact on the above four factors as well as various contending opinions and evidences 
regarding the same. The examination of the implications of undertaking these commitments in 
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South Sudan in light of its history of conflict, current trade and development prospects are also 
made but they are limited to the data available on the country.313 
4.2 The WTO’s market access commitments as a constraint on policy space 
In this section the term ‘policy space’ is defined and the contending views as to whether or not 
the WTO market access commitments do indeed constrain LDCs’ policy space are reviewed. 
 
It has been submitted that while countries engage in international interactions it is important for 
them to retain some room for national policy formulation that is independent of the international 
commitments and serves their own specific development needs.314 Much of the current debate 
on the role of national policies in economic development concerns the concept of policy space 
and focuses on the tension between international economic integration and the autonomy 
available to nation states to pursue policies that effectively support their economic 
development.315 As noted by Cooper, this tension culminates as a consequence of the dilemma 
of how to keep the manifold benefits from extensive international economic interaction free of 
crippling international restrictions while at the same time preserving a maximum degree of 
freedom for each nation to pursue its legitimate economic objectives.316 This degree of freedom 
accorded to each government to pursue its legitimate economic objectives is defined as ‘policy 
space’. It is the room that allows governments to manoeuver and develop their own policies.317  
 
The term policy space, in its current meaning appeared in about 2002 in the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) documents and acquired its first official 
status in the São Paulo Consensus of 2004. It was defined by the UNCTAD as: 
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‘The scope for domestic policies, especially in the areas of trade, investment and 
industrial development which might be framed by international disciplines, commitments 
and global market considerations’ 318 
 
This mini thesis strongly contends that the WTO through its market access accession guidelines 
has undoubtedly ushered in a new policy regime that continues to expand both the scope and 
the enforcement of the accession obligations for LDCs. There is no question that the adoption of 
these guidelines constricts the policy space that LDCs’ governments have, due to the fact that 
they have to adhere to these obligations and later have no option of reversing them without dire 
consequences. As Bacchetta and Piermartini both assert, the problem is not with the question of 
binding as binding has its own discretionary benefits.319 This research therefore asserts that the 
problem lies in the terms of the accession commitments to which the LDCs are compelled to 
bind that leave them with no freedom to manoeuver. This consequently inhibits and fails to 
support their economic development. 
 
The major concern among international observers continues to be that international rules are 
inhibiting developing countries’ policy space which prevents these countries from pursuing their 
developmental policies.320 Rodrick, for one, identifies the WTO rules as an example of such 
rules.321 He cautions that developing countries must resist the need to constrain their policy 
space by adopting encroaching WTO principles. Similarly, UNCTAD’s 2006 Trade and 
Development Report argued that the international trading regime’s rules and commitments 
restrict the de jure ability of developing countries to adopt a national development policy.322 
According to the UNCTAD Report: 
 
‘The increasing interdependence of national economies in a globalizing world and the 
emergence of rule-based regimes for international economic relations have meant that 
the space for national economic policy, is now often framed by international disciplines, 
commitments and global market considerations. It is for each Government to evaluate 
the trade-off between the benefits of accepting international rules and commitments and 
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the constraints posed by the loss of policy space. It is particularly important for 
developing countries, bearing in mind development goals and objectives, that all 
countries take into account the need for appropriate balance between national policy 
space and international disciplines and commitments.’323 
 
On the contrary, however, other observers, such as Azevedo and Razeen, do not share this 
view that WTO disciplines irremediably constrain countries’ policy space. They argue that the 
GATT/WTO disciplines do not act as a substitute for national governance in trade policy, but 
rather act as an additional help to good national governance. 324  This is so because the 
characteristics of the WTO rules are generally not of an absolute one-size-fits-all nature. Rather, 
they reflect rules that aim to protect individuals’ and businesses’ aspirations of being able to 
engage in international trade on a level playing field, on one hand, while, on the other hand, 
preserving the ability of governments to promote economic growth and development in diverse 
ways but which are also in line with their national goals and policies.325 
 
In the same light, Milner further points out that the rules and disciplines of the WTO were not 
created to limit policy space but were instead ultimately directed to create a freer international 
trading regime.326 He argues that the main principles of transparency, non-discrimination and 
reciprocity were specifically formulated so as to bind tariffs, encourage the lowering of tariffs, 
and constrain national governments’ ability to discriminate between domestic and foreign 
traders and between foreign and domestic producers and products.327 He further argues that the 
rules seek to encourage predictability and fairness by rejecting the use of particular trade policy 
instruments, encouraging the use of tariffs rather than non-tariff measures including but not 
limited to voluntary export restraints, and constraining the use of export subsidies that may 
distort trade.328 
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Shadlen then argues that despite general tariff reduction, the GATT/WTO rules still leave 
considerable room for local industrial development.329 He submits that the GATT/WTO do not 
compel tariffs to be eliminated or reduced, but require members to bind their tariffs, fixing a 
maximum level as a ceiling beyond which countries will be obliged to compensate injured 
parties. However since countries usually bind their tariffs at much higher levels than those 
actually applied, he contends that enough policy room is thus left at their disposal to adjust 
tariffs in support of their domestic objectives, like industrial development.330 This mini thesis 
however, strongly disagrees with the above and contends that the above argument is true only 
in the case of the majority of the WTO founders and incumbent members who have set and 
bound their tariffs at relatively higher levels and even kept some of their tariffs unbound.331(See 
section 3.2). Shalden’s optimism is not shared, especially when it assesses the kind of 
commitments that acceding LDCs are required to undertake as set out in the new accession 
guidelines. It is contended that the guidelines do not provide LDCs with the room to manoeuvre 
and adjust their commitments beyond the levels to which they are already bound on accession, 
and this thus limits considerably the space for their development. By pressing LDCs to accept 
commitments to reduce their tariffs to very low levels, incumbent WTO members are trying to 
take away the policy space needed by these countries especially that required to protect and 
nurture their infant industries in order to industrialise. 
 
The general justification that is often given for driving such a hard bargain with applicants for 
accession is that the benefits of the liberalisation demands sought on behalf of the commercial 
interests of the working party members will also inevitably accrue to the acceding countries, by 
forcing them to become more efficient and to abandon areas of their economies that are not 
internationally competitive.332 However it is further submitted that such argument may only have 
considerable validity when applied to fully developed economies which seem willing to bolster 
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inappropriate industries indefinitely.333 However, it is flawed when applied to LDCs seeking ways 
to enhance their own development. 
 
It is notable, however, that other than the disciplines and commitments provided for in the WTO, 
the policy space of WTO members may further be limited, modified and enhanced through other 
unilateral actions, such as, structural adjustment loan induced programs attached to the World 
Bank; through bilateral agreements, such as economic partnership agreements (EPAs); and 
regional trade agreements. 334  These additional and substantive influences on developing 
countries’ trade policy space, although invariably subject to WTO rules and disciplines, are not 
in general imposed or required by WTO membership.335 These influences fall beyond the scope 
of this research and are therefore not considered. The following section looks at how the WTO 
market access commitments curtail the ability of the LDCs to use infant industry protection to 
industrialise. 
4.3 The WTO’s market access commitments as a curtailment of the use of tariffs for 
infant industry protection 
In technical terms, infant industry protection is understood as a solution to the problems of 
knowledge transfer and learning.336 Time and, more importantly, investment in technological 
capabilities are needed for firms in LDCs to absorb advanced technologies. It is submitted that 
without an initial period of protection they are not going to survive international competition.337 
Presented with such a situation, infant industry protection is meant to provide the relevant firms 
the time and the resources by providing them with a variety of support programs for the 
industrial sector, including protection against import competition, special tax concessions, low 
tariff rates for imports of machinery and equipment, subsidised credit, guarantees, or rents, 
which can be reinvested and which are necessary for their knowledge upgrading process.338 
 
The legitimacy of infant industry protection for developing countries has been accepted ever 
since the creation of the GATT/WTO. Article XVIII of the WTO Agreement, provides for the 
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possibility of a wide range of government actions to help protect and encourage infant 
industries, subject to reasonable requirements to consult and notify WTO members and offer 
them compensatory adjustments where necessary.339 But the use of subsidies to support local 
production of new products or new modes of production is severely curtailed by the WTO. 
Article 3 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) outlaws the use 
of export subsidies and local content subsidies because they distort trade or make other 
countries refuse to open up their markets.340 According to Shafaeddin, what this Article implies 
is that a country cannot support its infant industries, whether or not for exports, either across the 
board or on a selective basis, when the subsidy is tied to export performance. Ironically though, 
this was a common practice until recently, particularly in East Asian countries.341 Article 8 of the 
ASCM permits subsidies which are of a more generalised character, such as, subsidies for R&D 
or infrastructural development, as opposed to directly selected industries.342 But it is submitted 
that these subsidies, apart from their appropriateness, are beyond the financial means of many 
developing countries.343 Thus, having proscribed the use of subsidies as a trade policy tool to 
protect infant industries, the role of tariffs acquires great significance. 
 
The difference between the bound and applied tariffs provides the policy space needed for 
industrial development.344 The WTO does not stipulate that members’ applied tariff levels be 
frozen, but the bound rates define the extent of the flexibility to vary the applied rates upward in 
response to particular economic circumstances.345 There is a gap between the levels of bound 
rates and applied rates of the LDC members of the WTO and it may be argued, as some 
scholars such as Page and Shadlen have, that because these countries have not taken 
advantage of the flexibility created by the space between their bound and applied rates, that it 
would suggest that they do not want to use tariffs for development policy.346 Therefore the major 
loss of potential policy space has already occurred and there would be no actual constraint on 
policy space by asking these countries to bind their tariffs at further lower levels. This argument 
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is flawed, however, when applied to recent events, such as, the global financial and economic 
crises and the resultant current state of play in LDCs, such as, the poor levels of economic and 
infrastructure development, as well as when applied to LDCs that are still in the early stages of 
their development and industrialisation process.347 They still need to retain their policy space as 
they seek ways to enhance their own development, including industrial growth and food 
security.348 
 
Evidently enough, policy space is a tool that was used extensively by developed countries for 
their own industrialisation.349 Virtually all of today’s successfully industrialised economies, whilst 
trying to catch up with the more advanced economies, used tariffs and other measures of 
protection, such as subsidies, in order to protect and foster their infant industries until they were 
able to withstand full competition.350 For example, the European countries, the US, and Japan, 
all employed high tariffs extensively to protect their infant industries in the early phases of their 
development.351 Although the precise form of protection varied considerably from one country to 
another, there are no examples of countries which liberalised first and successfully 
industrialised later.352 The proceeding discussion precisely discusses the extent to which the 
need of tariffs to protect the growth of infant industry may be relevant to South Sudan. 
 
4.3.1 Relevance of the infant industry protection argument to South Sudan 
This research submits that this argument on the protection of infant industry, however, may to a 
certain extent have an air of unreality when applied to the current state of South Sudan. This is 
so because it is a very poor and a newly independent African LDC that may at present struggle 
to find any export industries or goods sectors in which it may have a comparative advantage, 
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due to the adverse effects of years of conflict.353 The economy of South Sudan is characterised 
by a high dependence on a depleting oil resource, limited domestic production, and a high 
reliance on imports.354 The oil sector is the largest contributor to gross domestic product (GDP), 
both in terms of direct value-added and associated investment and support to the services 
industry.355  South Sudan derives nearly 98 percent of its budget revenues from oil, 356  and 
almost all foreign exchange earnings, thus making the South Sudanese economy extremely 
vulnerable to changes in oil prices and oil production levels.357 As a matter of fact, the drop in oil 
prices following the global economic crisis of 2008-2009, as well as the continuous dispute over 
oil transit fees between Sudan and South Sudan, has demonstrated the vulnerability of an oil 
dependent and undiversified economy.358  According to the South Sudan was Development 
Programme (SSDP) of 2011- 2013, the government as a result of the above unable to meet its 
spending commitments, including, paying salaries, state transfers and investment in social 
service delivery.359 Presently, therefore, the focus of the government has been to adopt policies 
and strategies aimed at diversifying the economy and diminishing the oil dominance,360  to non-
oil sectors including but not limited specifically to agriculture, mining, forestry and manufacturing 
industries.361 
 
Most of these industries, although barely developed and characterised by production on a small 
scale subsistence level, they have been identified as having the potential to boost South 
Sudan’s economy.362 The contribution of these industrial sectors to the GDP of South Sudan 
                                                          
353
 Most of all of South Sudan’s industries and infrastructures have been destroyed during the war and hence have 
to be built from scratch. 
354
 Government of South Sudan-South Sudan Development Plan of 2011-2013. (2011) 24. 
355
 South Sudan - African Economic outlook (2012) 3. Available at  
http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/countries/east-africa/south-sudan/ (accessed on 13/03/2013). 
356
 South Sudan economy profile 2012. Available at  
http://www.indexmundi.com/south_sudan/economy_profile.html  (accessed on 13/03/2013). 
357
 Government of South Sudan- South Sudan Development Plan of 2011-2013. (2011) 10. 
358
 Tadesse D ‘Post Independence: South Sudan: The challenges ahead.’(ISPI Working Paper, 2012)15. 
359
 The  loss of oil  revenues  created  large deficits  in the budget and  in the  balance  of  payments,  which  has  to  
be  met  by  cuts  in  imports  and  public  expenditure,  in  addition  to  alternative sources of financing. See South 
Sudan approved budget (2012-2013)1. 
360
 These include: fiscal policies, monetary policies, trade policies, etc. See list of policies adopted in African 
Economic outlook  of 2012. 
361
 South Sudan - African Economic outlook (2012) 3. Available at  
http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/countries/east-africa/south-sudan/ (accessed on 13/03/2013). 
362
 In its latest outlook, the IMF said South Sudan had sizeable economic potential due to oil, livestock, fishery, 
agricultural and forestry reserves. 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/55477/Business/Economy/South-Sudan-faces-major-challenges-
to-unlock-econo.aspx (accessed on 19/04/2013), ADBG.SS Interim Strategy paper 2012-2014.7. 
 
 
 
 
69 
 
may be very minimal but this contribution in terms of employment and export earnings can help 
ease the problems of unemployment and a negative trade balance for this import and oil 
dominated economy.363  Therefore, South Sudan will need to be able to protect itself from 
external competition as these industries are still in their infancy stages, particularly from its 
bordering countries whose industries are far more advanced. The only available option to do so 
upon accession to the WTO would be through tariffs; but binding at any low tariff rates 
undoubtedly entails the risk of not being able to accomplish this in the future. 
 
Various examples are given of sectors in the six LDCs that recently joined the WTO and that are 
now bearing the brunt of making extensive tariff reductions.364 The nascent dairy sector in 
Samoa which has been in existence for less than a decade now, provides an excellent 
emphasis for the above argument. Samoa’s dairy farming, despite still being on a small scale 
level is already providing this poor country with the desperately needed rural employment 
opportunities and sound nutritional input for its population, while decreasing the balance of trade 
deficit and saving foreign exchange by replacing some milk imports.365 Presently this sector 
occupies a tiny niche in Samoa’s economy, but has been identified as having the potential to 
grow and supply a considerable amount of the country’s dairy needs. However it may not be 
able to grow beyond its current niche if it is forced to compete without sufficient tariff protection 
with imports from much larger scale, super-efficient dairy production of New Zealand or 
Australia.366 Had Samoa been able to maintain its initial applied rates for agricultural products at 
50 percent, this would have enabled it to raise the tariffs on dairy products once it becomes 
necessary to do so to foster further growth of this industry. Unfortunately though, the rate at 
which Samoa was asked to bind at, which was way less than 50 percent, deprives it of the 
policy space it needs to make this possible.367  
                                                          
363
 The African Economic Outlook on South Sudan’s recent Economic Developments & Prospects. Available at 
http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/countries/east-africa/south-sudan/ (accessed on 29/07/2013). 
364
 Few examples include the beef industry in Samoa, Kava production in Vanuatu and Tonga etc. 
365
 Submission of Oxfam New Zealand to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the WTO negotiations of Samoa 
(2005)10. Available at  
http://www.oxfam.org.nz/imgs/whatwedo/MTF/ONZ%20on%20Samoa%20WTO%20accession.pdf (Accessed on 
13/08/2013). 
366
 Submission of Oxfam New Zealand to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the WTO negotiations of Samoa (2005) 
10. Available at  
http://www.oxfam.org.nz/imgs/whatwedo/MTF/ONZ%20on%20Samoa%20WTO%20accession.pdf (Accessed on 
13/08/2013)  
367
 Submission of Oxfam New Zealand to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the WTO negotiations of Samoa 
(2005)10. Available at  
 
 
 
 
70 
 
 
It is in light of the above, therefore, that the market access commitment on tariffs is seen as 
likely to impact on the policy space for the growth of infant industries. 
4.4 The WTO’s market access commitments and LDCs’ inability to protect domestic jobs 
and services sectors from foreign domination 
This subsection looks at how making the market access commitments in services is likely to 
impact on the acceding countries’ service sectors. It concludes by briefly expressing the major 
concern for South Sudan with regards to its domestic job markets should the country accede to 
the WTO. 
 
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) represents a first step towards the 
liberalisation in international trade in services.368 It is an agreement that aims to reduce the 
barriers faced by foreign companies in providing services, generally in the form of restrictions on 
investment, preferences for national service providers, or government regulation. 369  It 
recognises the rights of developing countries to make fewer commitments, open fewer sectors, 
liberalise fewer types of transactions, progressively extend market access in line with their 
development situation, and attach conditions when making access to their markets available to 
foreign service suppliers.370 However, WTO members have been disregarding these provisions 
and systematically demanding more services commitments from acceding countries than is the 
case for WTO members at a similar stage of development.371 (See section 3.2 above).372  LDCs 
have particularly been vulnerable to the pressure and consequences of making full 
commitments and therefore been unable to place effective limits on foreign ownership, market 
share, and number of service suppliers in vital sectors, including, education, health, 
construction, wholesale, retail, telecommunications and financial services. These are sectors for 
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which governments have public policy objectives, such as, equity, universal service obligations, 
and consumer protection.373 
 
The justification that has been given for demanding that LDCs liberalise their services sectors is 
that it could be beneficial to them in the following various ways. It will be instrumental to 
expanding LDCs’ access to basic services.374 In addition, imports of services will significantly 
improve performance by bringing greater competition, international best practice, better skills 
and technology transfer, employment creation, transparency, and predictability in trade and 
investment capital.375 Furthermore the entry of foreign service providers will yield better services 
for domestic consumers, and improve the performance and competitiveness of domestic 
firms.376 However, it is submitted that these benefits are nonetheless far from automatic, and 
that there may instead be a trade-off for LDCs’ national sovereignty, on one hand, and their 
social, developmental, and equity goals, on the other.377 This is so because pressures to open 
up these vital sectors may result in corporate takeovers by foreign multinationals, privatisation of 
LDCs’ service sectors, and to the ultimate erosion of government control.378  Moreover the 
absence of strong, effective regulations and a supervisory environment which are 
characteristics of most LDCs present a serious obstacle to imposing restrictions on the 
establishment of foreign companies or to monitoring their operations.379  Consequently, this 
could lead to severe consequences in the sectors liberalised. It is submitted that in the absence 
of effective regulatory regimes, service provision by a dominant supplier in a small market is 
likely to result in poor quality. In addition, the equal and affordable access to basic services by 
the general population may be undermined and the brunt felt by the poor majority who cannot 
afford to pay the increased cost of services.380 
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However, proponents of the GATS argue that such fears are groundless and show a 
misconception of the GATS provision on progressive liberalisation.381 This, they argue is mainly 
so because of the voluntary and flexible nature of the commitment process in which a member 
may modify, suspend, or withdraw commitments; the non-specificity of most of the GATS 
provisions; and the discretion of imposing limitations in the commitment schedules.382 They 
assert that there is no compulsion on member countries to open up a particular sector or 
subsector or a particular mode of supply if there are sensitivities and concerns involved about 
the potential impact.383 In addition, they assert that the terms of accession to the WTO do not 
directly require an acceding country to privatise or prevent it from maintaining public sector 
services or statutory corporations. 384  In this regard, therefore, they submit that the GATS 
commitment structure strikes a balance between the commercial interests, on the one hand, 
and regulatory concerns and public policy objectives on the other, of the acceding members. 
 
The above arguments are in the least bit compelling as the accession experiences to the WTO 
of the six recently acceded LDCs, and those of Tonga and Vanuatu in particular, suggest 
otherwise. The accession of Tonga resulted in making huge commitments in its services 
sectors, more far reaching than all the six recently acceded LDCs. Although the WTO accession 
agreement does not directly call for privatisation, Tonga ended up privatising sensitive sectors, 
such as education. 385  Furthermore, Vanuatu’s accession package called for extensive 
liberalisation of its education, retail, distribution, health, sanitation, and telecommunication 
sectors, and this ended up negatively impacting Vanuatu.386 The experiences of these recently 
acceded LDCs and the grueling resultant effects (which cannot be examined in detail due to 
time and space limitations of this mini-thesis) contrast starkly with those in favour of the 
GATS.387 It accentuates the reasons why an LDC like South Sudan should not consider joining 
the WTO.  Moreover, South Sudan’s services sectors are largely unregulated, and it is 
submitted that a premature accession to the WTO and the GATS now may lead to South Sudan 
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giving up substantial powers to regulate its services sectors.388 This could as a result hurt the 
country’s domestic job markets which needless to say is the situation already being evidenced 
at present. It has been noted that due to the lack of an effective regulatory system, South Sudan 
is experiencing an influx of thousands of skilled and unskilled workers from Kenya and Uganda, 
who are competing with an army of unemployed locals and displacing their jobs.389 This is 
crippling the country’s efforts of resuscitating the economy. 
4.5 Implications of WTO’s market access commitments for import tariffs 
4.5.1 The role of import tariffs in developing countries (DCs) and LDCs 
Whereas import tariffs account for less than 1 percent of government revenue in rich countries, 
many DCs heavily rely on them to help fund their state budgets.390 They draw at least part of 
their government revenue from customs tariffs, with some relying on duties for more than 30 
percent of revenue collections.391 This is mainly attributed to the fact that import duties are 
among the easiest to collect and less costly to administer than other forms of taxation, which is 
especially important for countries with a large informal sector and less administrative 
capacity.392 It has been observed that for some poor countries with little diversification in their 
economies, such as, Bangladesh, Namibia and Senegal, a third of their entire state budgets is 
financed through trade tariffs. 393  Further examples listed by the South Center include the 
Dominican Republic, Guinea, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, and Uganda where tariff 
revenues comprise more than 40 percent of all government revenues.394 
 
However, it is submitted that rapid liberalisation can have an extremely harmful impact on low 
and middle-income countries, mainly because the reduction in import tariffs significantly reduces 
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essential government revenue.395 Some free trade advocates, however, argue that the loss of 
income is relatively minimal. For example, in a special study carried out by the WTO on 
‘Adjusting to Trade Liberalisation’, the WTO quotes evidence that the impact of liberalisation on 
developing countries’ tax revenues has not necessarily been adverse.396 Gallagher, Wise and 
Kowalski submit that government revenue losses should not be an obstacle to liberalisation as a 
reduction in tariffs helps broaden the tax base. 397  This has also been the position of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) which particularly recommends the replacement of income 
with value added and sales taxes.398 They all submit that these other taxes easily compensate 
for the countries’ tariff income losses.399 
 
However, further research conducted on the impacts of liberalisation on developing countries 
contradict the above arguments and have shown to a greater extent that tariff losses for 
developing countries are significant and can far outweigh the benefits of liberalisation. 400 
Empirical studies suggesting that tariff revenues forgone from trade may be replaced by 
revenue from domestic sources, such as value added tax (VAT), sales or consumption tax has 
not proved to be the case. 401  A more comprehensive research by the IMF itself now 
demonstrates that low-income countries have only been able to recoup around 30% of what 
they have lost from reduced import taxes since the early 1980s.402 The results of the IMF 
research seem to be further supported by Aizenman and Jinjarak as well as Baunsgaard and 
Keen who examine whether low income countries can recover their trade revenues lost as a 
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result of trade liberalisation by reverting to domestic tax revenues.403 The results confirm that 
the degree of revenue recovery is extremely minimal. When compared to import tariffs, VAT, as 
well as the other suggested forms of taxation, have been found particularly ineffective at raising 
government revenues in countries with large informal sectors, due to the challenges involved in 
their collection, mainly, the sophisticated administration process required and the costs involved 
which are beyond the means of many poorer countries.404 Moreover, it is submitted that a 
change from import tariffs to a consumption tax usually has the effect of loading more of the tax 
burden onto the poor.405 
 
A case in point is Nepal which faced institutional and policy challenges while trying to mobilise 
domestic resources to make up for lost revenue from trade taxes as a result of WTO 
accession. 406  There was low tax compliance, misuse of discretionary power, lack of 
infrastructure for efficient tax administration, as well as low tax elasticity.407 Tonga which has 
historically been heavily dependent on tariffs and the port and services tax for a major portion of 
government revenue is another case in point.408 Until they were abolished in 2005, across the 
board import taxes of 25 percent were in place.409 On top of the 25 percent, import tariffs of up 
to 330 percent were imposed depending on the nature of the goods.410 As part of its accession 
process, Tonga had to undertake a major restructuring of its tax system which saw the 
introduction of a consumption tax of 15 percent to offset the tariffs that would be lost from 
binding at levels below 15 percent and 20 percent.411 But the impact on government as a result 
of the tariff reductions has been severe and according to a recent report by Oxfam, it was noted 
that the consumption tax has been ineffective in replacing the lost revenue.412  
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Likewise, Vanuatu derived the biggest single share of government revenue from import duties 
but was forced by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to make changes to its tax system as this 
was seen as essential for Vanuatu to be in a position to join the WTO, including the replacement 
of import tariffs by a VAT of 12.5 percent. 413  When the consumption tax was then later 
introduced in Vanuatu, it resulted in a sharp increase in the price of basic commodities in rural 
areas.414 It took Vanuatu’s tax base ten years to recover from the resulting loss of revenue.415 In 
addition to the above, Samoa also expressed concern over the shock its revenue base would 
suffer as a result of being asked to bind its tariff levels at either the then existing low applied 
rates or much lower than that. It was submitted that it was bound to have major implications for 
the country’s revenue base.416 All the above countries are some of the WTO recently acceded 
countries that were discussed in chapter 3.417 Specific reference is made to them in order to 
further emphasise the negative implications on the import tariffs that may likely result in the case 
of any acceding LDC that is pressured to make reductions in its tariff bindings. 
4.5.2 The Doha Development Agenda and its impacts on import tariffs 
It has been noted that in spite of the well documented harmful impacts of liberalisation on 
developing countries, the WTO still continues to impose severe limitations on their income from 
tariffs.418 The Doha Development Agenda (DDA) is not discussed in this research in detail but it 
is seen as a case in point. It is submitted that the DDA if completed will present a considerable 
liberalising force for many poor countries. 419  Although currently at an impasse, many 
commentators believe that the DDA will nonetheless be concluded when the political conditions 
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are right.420 Analyses of the impact of the DDA on developing countries abound in various 
areas, including but not limited to, agriculture, food security, poverty and services, but only to a 
limited extent on the impact of the proposed tariff cuts on developing countries’ revenues. 
However, studies by researchers such as Kowalski, Gallagher and Valenzuela, all conclude that 
the proposed tariff cuts and reductions for both the agricultural and Non-Agricultural Market 
Access (NAMA) products of developing countries, could lead to losses in tariff revenues in these 
countries.421 This is so mainly because once these tariff reductions are bound, they cannot be 
withdrawn or reversed without due compensation to those WTO members that will be affected 
by such action.422 Hence, should these countries need to raise extra revenue through import 
tariffs; this option will not be available.423 For example, as a result of Thailand’s tariff reforms to 
reduce the average applied tariff rate from about 30 percent in 1994 to 17 percent in 1997, it is 
estimated that its collected import duties fell from 19 percent of government revenue in fiscal 
year 1994 to 13 percent in 1997. 424  According to calculations by the UNCTAD, a further 
projection made by them indicated that developing countries could lose up to $63.4bn through 
lost import tax revenues on NAMA goods alone as a result of the proposed tariff reduction 
levels.425 This figure is thought to have increased significantly in recent years due to the growth 
in international trade volumes.426 This sum is four times less than what the UNCTAD predicted 
these countries would lose in increased trade if the Doha Round of negotiations succeeds.427 
 
Current LDCs in the WTO are not required to make any reductions in their agricultural tariffs 
under Article 15 of the Agreement on Agriculture but are required to bind all agricultural 
products.428 They are also not required to make any tariff reductions in terms of the NAMA 
negotiations and their only required contribution is to substantially increase their binding 
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coverage at levels in accordance with their needs and development.429 This may be applauded 
on the ground that this flexibility will allow the participating LDCs to retain their import tariffs 
without fear of losing these revenues. However, when this provision on the flexibility and special 
consideration granted to LDCs currently in the WTO is juxtaposed with the same provisions in 
the WTO guidelines for acceding LDCs, calling upon incumbent WTO members to let applicant 
LDCs make commitments at levels that are commensurate with their needs and development, 
the same sentiments may not be shared. This is so because one of the development needs of 
the LDCs is not to lose their tariffs through acceding and binding at low tariff levels as 
incumbent members are requesting of applicant LDCs.  Although evidence of LDCs’ reliance on 
import tariffs as an additional source of government revenue or the impact of their loss thereof is 
not as widely documented as that for DCs, it may be safe to argue that the impact may not be 
any different or that it is likely be more adverse due to the differences in their levels of 
development.430 The following discussion reviews the likely implications of tariff reduction for 
South Sudan. 
4.5.3 Tariff reduction and its implication for revenue in South Sudan 
It has been submitted that due to the historical economic marginalisation of Southern Sudan by 
the North and decades of armed conflict, trade in South Sudan has been highly localised and 
predominantly sourced from Kenya, Uganda and Sudan.431 At present, there is neither sufficient 
domestic production for markets for agriculture products nor for production for export markets 
outside of oil; thus South Sudan is highly dependent on imports.432 Limited trade data indicate 
that about 60% of imports from Uganda and Kenya are agriculture products, but in the capital 
city (Juba) and a few other economic centres, there are booming construction and service 
sectors. 433  South Sudan nonetheless relies on these taxes to help finance its public 
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 The LDCs are not required to make any reductions in agricultural tariffs. For non-agricultural tariff bindings the 
scenario calls for 50 percent cuts in developed countries, 33 percent in developing countries, and zero in the LDCs. 
See the proposed Swiss formula in the Simple guide to NAMA negotiations. Available at  
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/markacc_e/nama_negotiations_e.htm (accessed on 02/08/2013). 
430
 This is based on the evidence collected on the importance of import revenues in developing countries.  The 
conclusion is drawn that because LDCs are at a much lower development status, that the impacts are likely to be 
more adverse. 
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 World Bank ‘Sudan: The road toward sustainable and broad-based growth’ (2009) 10. 
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 The vast majority of products sold in South Sudan are imported. Goods ranging from construction materials to 
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that supplies of basic grains and flour, sugar, vegetables and fruit, as well as some fish, sold in markets such as Juba 
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infrastructure and provide services necessary to support much-needed economic and social 
development. Initially according to s 87 of the Taxation Act of 2009, the tax rates applicable to 
all goods entering South Sudan were stipulated as follows; 2 percent for all food processed 
items, 4 percent for all other goods and 6 percent for vehicles of all kinds.434 However, in terms 
of the Taxation Act (Amendment 2) provisional order 2012, the above tax rates no longer apply 
and s 87 has been deleted.435 In terms of the provisional order a tax rate of 3 percent is 
chargeable on all imports into South Sudan. 436 Against this backdrop of having very little 
domestic production capacity to substitute for imports, the current trade policy of South Sudan 
can be considered as very liberal as one that seeks to impose little restriction on the movement 
of goods and labour across international borders.437 It is submitted that such a trade regime is 
relevant for the absorptive capacity of the country as restrictions on the flow of goods will 
increase costs and create bottlenecks that are likely to negatively impact on its economic 
growth.438 
 
However, for a resource rich and aid rich country like South Sudan which pays for all its imports 
entirely with oil revenue and foreign aid, both accruing to the government,439 it is argued that the 
role of tariffs as an important source of government revenue may not at present be of great 
significance. This therefore presents an exception to the above argument. According to Collier 
and Venables, tariffs will reduce the domestic purchasing power of the oil revenues and the 
foreign aid, devaluing resource revenue and aid flow in real terms.440 Thus what is seemingly 
gained in tariff revenue will be lost in terms of higher costs elsewhere in the economy.441 
However, it is noteworthy that oil is a perishable natural resource which may not be in 
production indefinitely and particularly that that of South Sudan has been estimated to only last 
for one more decade before the oil wells run dry.442 Therefore, South Sudan undoubtedly will 
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have to resort to alternative and additional sources of generating revenue. Such non-oil revenue 
bases include trade tariffs. However, given the significance attached to import tariffs as a source 
of revenues in low income countries and the failure of being able to substitute the loss thereof 
by expanding domestic tax bases, it is submitted that if South Sudan accedes to the WTO now, 
such an alternative may be foreclosed. This is because the WTO accession deal will include a 
ceiling for tariffs and such bound rates are inflexible. South Sudan will not have the opportunity 
to use tariffs to raise revenue if the oil revenues cease to exist or if its alternative domestic tax 
base fails to offset such losses. 
4.6 Conclusion 
In view of the above, it can be argued that as a result of incumbent WTO members continuously 
pressuring acceding LDCs to make binding commitments which are not at the same levels of 
the incumbent WTO members or at levels which commensurate with the LDCs’ levels of 
economic development; the following potential implications are envisaged. First, the extensive 
commitment to bind at very low tariff rates is a constraint on LDCs’ policy space which is 
necessary to promote export diversification and industrial growth. South Sudan is already at an 
extreme disadvantage due to its history of war which destroyed its infrastructure. In addition, 
without the ability to use tariffs to establish ‘infant industries’, South Sudan will face even greater 
difficulties in being able to develop its local economy. Secondly, South Sudan lacks the effective 
domestic regulatory regime that may enable it to regulate foreign operations and monopoly 
within the country and ensure that even the poor afford basic services. Thirdly, it curtails the 
ability of LDCs the benefit to use import tariffs as an additional source of trade revenues. The 
important fiscal role of tariffs in LDCs militates against their reduction upon their accession to 
the WTO. Moreover, a closer study and examination of South Sudan has revealed its current 
limited export potential as well as the need to explore alternative options to offset the loss of 
revenues as a result of the depleting oil reserves. However, the option of using tariffs to achieve 
this may not be available if South Sudan accedes to the WTO now, due to the inflexibility of 
adjusting tariffs upwards once they have already been bound. 
  
 
 
 
 
81 
 
CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Conclusion 
The objective of this research has been to analyse the accession to the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) of least developed countries (LDCs) with a view to drawing attention to the 
possible implications of the WTO’s market access commitments on these countries, but with the 
further emphasis on South Sudan. This was done in order to answer the question whether or 
not it would be in South Sudan’s best interest to consider joining the WTO. To achieve this goal, 
the first task was to highlight and give a background of the WTO and its objectives as well as to 
briefly draw the nexus between the WTO accession process and the unfairness thereof towards 
LDCs, as evidenced by their consequent market access commitments to the WTO (discussed in 
section 3.2). 443 To further assist in answering this main question, the following three research 
questions were developed in chapter 1: first, what are the legal requirements for South Sudan to 
accede to the WTO?; secondly, what are the potential implications of the excessive market 
access commitments for the development of trade in South Sudan?; and thirdly, how can these 
implications be averted to match the trade and development needs of South Sudan? The 
answers to the above questions were given in the subsequent chapters of this research. 
Chapter 2 began by briefly introducing the key principles of the WTO. It was shown that the 
WTO laws are based on certain core principles and rules which include but are not limited to the 
following; the principle of non-discrimination, predictability and transparency. 444  It then 
proceeded to examine the complexities involved in the accession of LDCs to the multilateral 
system and it was noted that even in spite of the more favourable terms of accession pledged to 
LDCs under the Doha Mandate, there is little evidence that such newly acceding countries are 
granted significant differential terms, and that the accession process is still lengthy and 
complex.445 This chapter showed that accession is the first step to becoming a member of the 
WTO. It is a formal legal commitment by the acceding country to comply fully with multilateral 
trade and its rules.446 Once a country decides to join the WTO, it will have to make an official 
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application for membership and the end of this process will mark the commencement of the 
enforcement of commitments and concessions as well as compliance with WTO rules by it.447 
Article XII of the Marrakesh Agreement is the legal provision that governs the WTO accession 
process but it was specifically noted that the core of the accession negotiations lies in the 
determination of favourable terms of accession. As a matter of fact, the terms of accession 
contain the ‘membership fee’ that the acceding country will pay to be able to join the WTO. 
However, on closer scrutiny of Article XII, it was noted that it gives members carte blanche to 
impose unreasonable conditions on acceding countries, as it fails to specify the level of 
commitments, the scope and extent of demands that can be placed on them. Consequently this 
ambiguity puts the accession process in a strictly negotiating than rule-compliance context and 
the acceding countries bear the brunt of not receiving what they deserve but rather what they 
negotiate.  
Chapter 2 further argued that the rationales for LDCs acceding to the WTO are tied to the 
benefits likely to accrue to them on membership. These include but are not limited to the 
orthodox propositions that WTO accession will promote economic development, increase 
market access, increase FDI, achieve effective domestic policy making institutions, and 
enhance dispute settlement in LDCs.448 But on further scrutiny of these rationales, several 
dissenting views emerged. However, it was noted that the benefits of acceding to the WTO are 
neither automatic nor immediate and that there exists a deep dichotomy between the theory and 
reality of the benefits of WTO membership, most especially for LDCs. This research cautions 
that LDCs should not be hasty in acceding to the WTO, but rather first weigh the benefits versus 
the costs of this decision. It further asserts that the impact whether beneficial or adverse of 
WTO membership on any acceding LDC will ultimately depend on that LDC’s ability to reconcile 
the mismatch between the perceived benefits of free trade and its limited ability as a LDC to 
reap those benefits. 
Chapter 3 systematically examined the six recently acceded LDCs’ market access commitments 
and compared them with those of the incumbent WTO members as well as with the guidelines 
for the facilitation of the accession of LDCs into the WTO. The aim of this assessment was to 
determine whether the WTO incumbent members have lived up to their promise as stated in the 
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Accession Guidelines for LDCs.  These Guidelines required incumbent WTO members to 
exercise restraint when seeking market access commitments and to do so in a manner that is 
commensurate with the level of an applicant’s economic development and not in excess of that 
of incumbent WTO members at the same level of economic development. However, this 
analysis only confirmed that incumbent WTO members have failed to live up to this promise and 
that the general trend in the WTO was to request LDCs to make ever-increasing market 
accession commitments, which go far beyond what is commensurate with their level of 
economic development, capacity and trade and financial needs. 
Chapter 4 discussed the implications of lowering tariffs and the excessive commitments for 
South Sudan in light of the difficulties experienced by other recently acceded LDCs to the WTO. 
It analysed the concept of ‘policy space’ as well as the argument for infant industry protection, 
and this research submitted that the WTO market access commitments will remove the ability of 
LDCs’ governments to pursue their legitimate economic objectives by using tariffs and to 
successfully industrialise as do current advanced economies which employed policy space to 
achieve their economic success. This chapter further analysed the services commitments and it 
was submitted that these commitments would render it difficult for LDCs to protect domestic 
jobs and services sectors from foreign domination.  It also assessed the contribution of import 
tariffs to the government revenues of LDCs and concluded that LDCs stand to lose a significant 
amount of revenues as a resultant effect of these accession commitments. It was however 
acknowledged in this chapter that although South Sudan at present barely has advanced 
industries or services sectors due to its recent war-torn past that destroyed its infrastructures 
and institutions, acceding to the WTO now would not give render it any special treatment 
different to that of the six recently acceded LDCs that joined the WTO. The same commitments 
or even more commitments may be asked of this LDC as well. Thus the resulting implications 
would be none other than the ones expressed above. 
In light of all the above, therefore,  this research submits that WTO accession is a one-way 
process and not multilateral trade liberalisation, in which those that are already members of the 
Organisation exercise their privileged positions to extract as much concessions as they possibly 
can from the candidate countries. Needless to say, this is what renders the costs and benefits of 
WTO accession a bittersweet paradox.449 This research bases its conclusion on the premise 
that on one hand, the WTO is expected to be a multilateral trading system that gives due 
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attention to the needs and aspirations of DCs and LDCs, but contrary to this, the process of 
WTO accession tends to proceed on highly mercantilistic terms, with WTO members aiming to 
extract the highest possible concessions from acceding candidates. The WTO incumbent 
members proceed to negotiate in this way with no particular concern either for the possible 
barriers that the acceding LDC countries face in their own markets or indeed for the average 
level of their own bound commitments. 
5.2 Recommendations 
In order to facilitate the accession of LDCs to the WTO, this research recommends first and 
foremost that the procedural steps for accession be strengthened, and that most especially the 
ambiguity of the rules governing the accession process should be done away with. It is of the 
view that Article XII of the Marrakesh Agreement should be specific in detail by establishing 
criteria for the accession ‘terms to be agreed.’450 In sharing the optimism of Grynberg, Dugal 
and Razzaque the specification of these terms might contribute to treatment of acceding 
developing countries (DCs) and LDCs which would be congruent to that of the special and 
differential treatment of developing and least developed members.451  
Secondly, countries seeking accession should not be asked to commit to more than that of 
comparable economies that are already WTO members. There should be a yardstick regarding 
the degree of commitment expected from acceding countries. There is no stark contrast 
between this recommendation and that of the special and differential treatment provisions 
according to which developing countries are asked not to commit to more than they can handle 
according to their state of development and in line with their development goals. However, this 
recommendation goes a little further in providing criteria, by comparison with similar economies, 
for assessing the extent of commitments that could be expected from the acceding country. It 
should not be interpreted to mean that acceding countries should concede as little as possible 
and make these concessions only after ensuring that they are unavoidable, and try if possible to 
construe any commitments narrowly. Rather, that the commitments must originate from within 
the acceding country instead of being imposed by the WTO or its members. The acceding 
countries may however be warned of the difficulties of maintaining a particular policy measure 
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such as protectionist measures, but be allowed to maintain them if they wish as that would be a 
fair treatment as was evident in the past.452 
Thirdly and in a bid to challenge both Grynberg’s and Joy’s cynicism that it is only the extremely 
naïve who believe that the accession process will reform,453 one of the major aspects being 
emphasised by this research and that may serve as a recommendation as well, is the urgent 
need to translate into action the WTO members’ commitment to simplify the accession process 
for LDCs. This research proposes that one way of making this possible is by converting the 
accession guidelines into a legally binding document, as opposed to being mere guidelines that 
impose no obligation or reprimand whatsoever upon the incumbent WTO members who fail to 
adhere to them.  In particular, the proposed legal document should ensure that acceding LDCs 
are not asked to undertake higher levels of commitments than those made by the founding 
LDCs of the WTO. All acceding LDCs should only be required to implement specific 
commitments in services once the necessary domestic regulations are in place.   
Lastly, this research submits that there are viable alternatives to joining the WTO. This research 
does not argue against unilateral, bilateral or regional trade liberalisation whenever the realities 
warrant so that LDCs can proceed at a pace based on their own particular economic realities. It 
however strongly opposes the untimely multilateral liberalisation under the WTO system and 
instead makes a recommendation for alternative forms of prudent liberalisation which DCs and 
LDCs can monitor and manage. In addition, this research contends that true liberalisation of a 
country’s market does not necessarily require an international commitment as such and it can 
be done unilaterally.  
Therefore, in answering the question as to whether or not South Sudan should join the WTO, 
this answer is clearly in the negative. This research recommends that in order to avert the 
potential adverse implications associated with WTO accession commitments, South Sudan 
should endeavour to first liberalise unilaterally before it considers joining the multilateral system. 
If South Sudan accedes to the WTO now, this will be a sealed deal which will effectively be 
impossible to undo. If WTO accession turns out to have the major negative implications 
envisaged in this research, it will be too late for South Sudan to withdraw from this Organisation. 
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In theory, countries can withdraw from the WTO but none ever has, which means that South 
Sudan would be signing its own death sentence. 
This research contends that South Sudan’s economic future will inevitably be as a niche 
supplier to the regional community as well as the world economy at large, exporting agricultural 
products, industrial goods and various forms of services. This will require an active role by the 
government to adopt the right policies now, in order to promote and support the development of 
agriculture and new industries to fill the niches in South Sudan. By restricting what South 
Sudan’s government could do to promote all the above, a decision not against WTO accession 
will not represent a missed opportunity. 
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